

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Bulletin

Vol. XXXVII, No. 960

November 18, 1957

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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXVII, No. 960 • PUBLICATION 6560

November 18, 1957

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 10, 1955).

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The Syrian Question in the U.N. General Assembly

*Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 18¹

We have been called to consider the request of the Syrian Government that an item, entitled "Complaint about threats to the security of Syria and to international peace,"² be inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly. The Syrian explanatory memorandum accompanying the request has asked that a commission be set up by the General Assembly to investigate the situation on the Syrian-Turkish border and to report to the Assembly.

The United States has been concerned over recent developments stemming from Soviet infiltration into the Middle East. In his address of September 19,³ Secretary Dulles reserved the right to make concrete proposals. The United States has particularly in mind the problem of indirect aggression and possible violation of the "Essentials of Peace" resolution.⁴ However, as Mr. Dulles stated last Wednesday,⁵ the United States has deferred to the apparent preference of the Arab States to deal with this matter on a regional basis.

Now that Syria has raised this matter, we, of course, welcome discussion in the broader forum of the United Nations. We do welcome the opportunity for a full airing of the Soviet allegations in particular. I am confident that the United Nations discussion and investigation will show not only the absurdity of the charges against the

United States and Turkey but will also reveal the true source of tension in the entire area.

The Soviet charges against us in the letter which Mr. Gromyko submitted a few days ago⁶ are, of course, clumsy and flagrant fabrications. They cannot prove one of these charges. But, of course, these charges are not to be judged at face value but in the light of some ulterior motive, such as, for example, the expansion of Soviet influence and the general desire to keep the world stirred up, to keep the world excited.

This, I think, Mr. Chairman, makes the present a particularly good time for us all to keep calm. Unlike some members here, the United States has never feared General Assembly discussion and we have never failed to heed General Assembly recommendations. We are ready, as always, to take any steps to strengthen the peace and security of the Middle East. The United States, therefore, supports inscription of the Syrian item and believes that it should be considered by the General Assembly in plenary session on an urgent basis. We hope that this will contribute to the peace and security of the Middle East and of the world.

Let me utter this reassuring note and do so by reaffirming the pledge regarding the Middle East contained in the White House statement of April 9, 1956:⁷

The United States, in accordance with its responsibilities under the charter of the United Nations, will observe its commitments within constitutional means to oppose any aggression in the area. The United States is likewise determined to support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression. The United States is

¹ Made in the General Committee during debate on the inscription of the Syrian item (U.S. delegation press release 2776).

² U.N. doc. A/3699.

³ BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1957, p. 555.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1949, p. 807.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1957, p. 712.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/3700.

⁷ BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668.

confident that other nations will act similarly in the cause of peace.

As I finish, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I note that the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Syrian request for this agenda item refers to threats both to the independence and to the security of Syria. I assume, therefore, that there would be no objection if the agenda item read, as the Syrian letter does, that is, "Threats to the independence and security of Syria and to international peace." I ask the representative of Syria whether he objects to such a change.

[In a further intervention Mr. Lodge said:]

Let me say that, if the representative of Syria is not interested in including the word "independence," then of course I shall not press it, particularly as the language in the title of the item not only refers to "threats to the security of Syria" but also to "threats to international peace." This phraseology, I think, is broad enough to permit the Assembly enough latitude to do whatever it wants to in considering this item. I was just trying to be helpful.⁸

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 22⁹

I dislike saying what I am going to say about any member of the United Nations, but the time has come for a little plain speaking and the need for plain speaking compels me to say this: What has been said here this afternoon by the Soviet representative makes it all too clear that the contention of urgency which he has made does not really ring true at all. If there were in fact an urgent threat to the peace, the place to go under the charter is clearly the Security Council. It is there for that purpose, and the world knows that that is why it is there.

The moment, therefore, that the decision was made not to go to the Security Council, notice in effect was served on the whole world that the situation was in truth not urgent and that some kind of game was being played here, with regard to which the rest of us were not being treated with

complete frankness and with complete candor. This fact alone, Mr. President, shows the hollowness and, if I may say so, the insincerity of the Soviet contention.

Now, Mr. President, the United States not only does not deny that the matter is important. We contend that it is very important. But its very importance makes it imperative that we take time for reflection and contemplation and particularly that we not brush lightly aside the offer of King Saud to mediate this dispute.

When the General Committee met to consider the Syrian complaint "about threats to the security of Syria and to international peace," the United States joined in voting for the inclusion of the item on the agenda of the General Assembly. In explanation, I pointed out that the United States had deferred its original intent to bring before the United Nations recent developments stemming from Soviet infiltration into the Middle East, in view of the apparent preference of the Arab States to deal with the matter on a regional basis.

We now have received information that substantial efforts at mediation are under way, under the lead of His Majesty King Saud. We welcome the efforts of this great leader.

The Chief of State of the Turkish Government has agreed to the principle of mediation. The Assembly has now also just been informed that Mr. Zorlu, Turkish Minister of State, left for Riyadh this morning. These acts of good faith of the Turkish Government should be matched by Syria.

Let me say that I followed carefully the Syrian statement. I am referring to the one by Mr. Zeineddine. He stated that no mediation exists. Of course that is true, Mr. President. But what is equally true is that an offer of mediation has been made and mediation can take place the moment Syria says "yes."

We trust, therefore, that Syria will reconsider its position during the course of the next few days. Surely the response made here this afternoon by the Syrian representative cannot be taken as final.

The initiative of His Majesty King Saud is entirely in line with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and in particular article 33 of the charter, which states that parties to any dispute shall first of all seek a solution through other

⁸ On Oct. 18 the General Committee, without objection, recommended that the Syrian item be inscribed in the current agenda and that it be taken up directly by the plenary of the General Assembly.

⁹ Made in plenary session (U.S. delegation press release 2782).

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peaceful means of their own choice. We sincerely hope that through joint efforts this matter will be solved.

In the existing circumstances the course which the General Assembly can best follow seems clear. We think that the General Assembly should wish the governments concerned success in their worthwhile endeavor and defer any further consideration here pending the outcome of the mediation efforts.

The United States considers mediation between the Governments of Syria and Turkey a very constructive move, particularly in view of Turkish assurances of good will and friendship toward her neighbor Syria. It will be recalled that on September 27, during the general debate of this body, the representative of Turkey said:

We in Turkey have affection and respect for the people of Syria with whom, as with all Arab nations, we are linked by cultural, religious and historic ties. We value the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and consider a strong, prosperous and independent Syria on our southern border as an additional guarantee of our own security.

As I conclude, Mr. President, let me say that in striking contrast with this attitude stands the contrived bluster of the Soviet Government, which, judging from official pronouncements of its leaders over the past days and judging by the grist of its propaganda mill, is not seeking a peaceful solution to this problem but rather to stir up excitement and emotion in a part of the world which, as all students of recent history know, has been the traditional object of Soviet expansionist aims.

I shall pass over the old and unfounded charges of wrongdoing which the Soviet Union has directed against the United States as well as against Turkey and which I presume are brought up as a screen to its expansionist plans. The speech of Mr. Gromyko was certainly in the most violent traditions of the late Mr. Stalin, the late Mr. Vyshinsky, and Mr. Molotov. Of course, none of these charges are true. Mr. Gromyko cannot prove one single one. He does not say them because he thinks they are true but for some ulterior motive. And we can all imagine what that is.

I do not suppose that there is anything that a Soviet speaker can say any more that can surprise me, no matter how extreme it is. But, when I first came here in 1953, I was astounded to hear the North Atlantic Treaty Organization described as

an offensive alliance. Since then that charge has been made almost every day, and again repeated by Mr. Gromyko.

So, merely for the record, I will say that the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty is the statement that an attack on one is an attack on all. In other words, we stay where we are unless we are attacked.

Can there be anything more defensive than that?

Remember that the North Atlantic Treaty was only evolved after the Soviet Union had gobbled up Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania. I am not sure that I mentioned them all.

I presume they are annoyed because we just did not lie down and let them just gobble up everything else. But we in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to get together for our own defense.

Mr. President, in the midst of all these attempts to use words and fabrications to stir up excitement, let us remember that actions speak louder than words. United States actions here in the General Assembly a year ago—and no amount of oratory today can erase our actions then—prove how deeply we desire peace in the Middle East and how far we will go to uphold the charter. And, while we were working for peace last year, the Soviet Union was butchering Hungary. Is it any wonder that everyday citizens all over the world today are asking themselves: "Last year it was Hungary. This year is it Syria?"

I do not wish to take your time with recriminations. Gentlemen, let us keep this thing in peaceful channels. Let us give King Saud's offer a chance.

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 25¹⁰

Three days ago we heard a speech by the Soviet representative [Andrei Gromyko]. It was calumnious. It was provocative. It was totally contrary to the ideals of peaceful settlement, of truth, and of integrity to which this Assembly is devoted. In the few remarks which I made after his speech I tried briefly to give it the response which it deserved. I really thought I had said enough.

¹⁰ Made in plenary session (U.S. delegation press release 2787).

But many members have asked me to reply categorically to this speech, and out of respect for these requests I shall now take about 20 minutes under the right of reply, which each member has here, to refute these charges of the Soviet Union and to state very bluntly just exactly what the situation is as a result of this attempt of theirs to bully the world into submission.

I warn the Soviet Union now that they will not like what I am going to say, and I repeat now what I have told them many times in the 4 years that I have been here—that, while I shall never begin an altercation with the Soviet Union, and I never have, I shall always reply when charges are made against the Government which I have the honor to represent. In this case I shall do so not merely in a defensive spirit, but I shall go further and reveal the true motivation of the Soviet attack and then say what the United States stands for affirmatively and constructively in the Middle East. There is not a representative of a government here in this hall—that is, of a free government—who would not feel the same obligation to reply if his country were attacked as mine has been.

I, therefore, make this refutation partly out of respect for the opinions of the members of the Assembly but also because I believe that the challenge which we face has grown clear and that this is a moment when plain speaking—which possibly sometimes should be avoided in a diplomatic forum—will actually strengthen peace and tranquillity in the Middle East and will, in truth, preserve and promote the well-being, security, and independence of the countries of this vital region. That is what the United States wants, and that is the basic motive underlying what I am about to say.

Campaign of Vilification Against U.S.

Some time ago the Soviet Union decided to carry on and inspire a campaign of vilification against the United States in relation to the Middle East. At press conferences and in propaganda originating in Moscow, in a letter to the Secretary-General,¹¹ in corridor conversations, and in speeches in the United Nations, allegations were made that the United States, of all things, is seeking to promote war in the Middle East. All

this was very carefully done in a way that does not require the Soviet Union to prove one of its charges, which, of course, they could not do.

You have all heard these charges. The United States, it is alleged, attempted to overthrow the present government of Syria. Having failed in these efforts, according to Soviet spokesmen, the United States sought to persuade Turkey to launch an attack upon Syria late in October. There have, of course, been variations of this tale since it was first spun by Mr. Gromyko on September 10.¹² The claim has been made that Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon were to commit aggression, together with Turkey. You have heard that story. However, in all cases the story was essentially the same. This was an American "plot."

We have heard of American "plots" from Soviet representatives on previous occasions. There was the alleged "plot" against Hungary. There was an alleged "plot" against North Korea, which was used as a smokescreen to cover the aggression against the Republic of Korea. The United States was even accused, believe it or not, of having "plotted" against the Soviet Union, with the aid of the late head—I might say, unlamented head—of the Soviet secret police, Lavrenti Beria. Only last winter the General Assembly rejected by an overwhelming majority the Soviet charge that the United States was subverting the governments of the Soviet satellites.¹³ Every one of these American "plots" was invented in Moscow—and usually just after the Soviet Union had been overwhelmingly rebuked and repudiated here in the United Nations.

Now what are the known facts in this case? Let me review the actions of various countries, beginning with Syria.

On August 12 the Syrian officials announced that they had uncovered still another American "plot"—this time to overthrow the Syrian Government. This announcement was followed by political and command changes in Damascus which the Soviet Union has clearly revealed are pleasing to it.

The Soviet Government has been sending large quantities of arms to Syria, including jet aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles, etc. There is no question whatever of challenging any country's right to acquire arms. Let me make that clear.

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/3700 dated Oct. 17.

¹² For background see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1957, p. 525.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 18, 1957, p. 463.

But we are entitled to inquire regarding the motives behind sending such large quantities of arms into a potentially explosive area at a particularly tense moment, because such shipments in such circumstances inevitably heighten tensions. That is common sense.

In this connection, I cannot refrain from pointing out the dangers involved in a policy of indiscriminate distribution of arms to nonmilitary groups of the population of a country at a time when deliberate efforts are being made to incite the people of that country to hostile acts against a neighbor. In such circumstances, no one can guarantee that an incident will not occur which could have grave consequences.

Steps Taken by U.S. Government

I come now to the steps taken by the United States Government. Mr. Loy Henderson, one of our most experienced diplomats, was asked to expedite a trip to the Middle East which had been planned some time before.¹⁴ He was asked to consult with United States and foreign officials and to obtain a firsthand impression of current developments. This was the substance of his instructions, and this was the purpose of the trip.

We are curious to know why the sensibilities of the Soviet Government should have been so injured by Mr. Henderson's trip. Could it have something to fear, something to hide?

Steps Taken by Turkish Government

The Turkish Government also took certain steps. It proceeded to strengthen its defenses along the Syrian border in the light of these Soviet activities in Syria—in particular, the possible establishment of a Soviet arms depot on Turkey's southern border. This Turkish action, I submit, was perfectly reasonable. In no manner has Syria been endangered. The Government of Turkey has repeatedly given its solemn assurances that this move was a purely defensive precaution and that it has absolutely no intention of attacking Syria or of intervening in Syria's domestic affairs.

Turkey has a distinguished record in the work of the United Nations. It has ably performed its duties on the Security Council and on the Economic and Social Council. It has done whatever was requested of it in supporting the United

Nations in action. The United States bows to none in its admiration for the courageous service of the Turkish soldiers who fought under the unified command of the United Nations in repelling Communist aggression in Korea. Turkey stood firmly with the overwhelming majority of the United Nations during the Communist crushing of Hungary last year, despite the fact that it was the next-door neighbor of the government which was committing this crime.

The United Nations can be proud of Turkey, which has firmly supported it and which has complied with its charter obligations and the resolutions of the United Nations. One need but ask, in passing, whether the record of its accusers is as good.

I would like to point out several additional facts in this connection. The Soviet representative alleges that "the Turkish General Staff together with American advisers has elaborated detailed plans for an attack by Turkey on Syria." I wonder whether he is aware that the four members of the Turkish Joint Chiefs of Staff recently resigned in order to be candidates for election to the Turkish Parliament. Certainly this could not happen in a country which was "vigorously preparing" a military attack. I can speak from experience that running for office takes all your time.

The Government of Turkey has also, as we know, accepted the offer of good offices extended by His Majesty King Saud. A country willing to seek an amicable settlement of differences is not a country bent on war.

Soviet War of Nerves

Finally, I come to the heart of the matter—the behavior of the Soviet Union, and particularly its war of nerves against Turkey. Along with its propaganda charges of a Turkish plot against Syria, the Soviet Union has been openly threatening Turkey with annihilation and extinction. Mr. Gromyko on September 10 warned Turkey that it "may land in an abyss" and that "a great disaster awaits it." Premier Bulganin in his message of September 11 to Premier Menderes of Turkey warned indirectly of a Soviet attack and asserted that "great calamities" awaited Turkey if it did not heed these warnings. These statements were played up in the usual manner by the Soviet press.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1957, p. 487.

A remarkable fact is that these accusations against Turkey were first launched not in Damascus but in Moscow—even though Syria was supposed to be the intended victim of the imaginary conspiracy. There is significance in that, Mr. President.

On October 7, Mr. Khrushchev continued this Soviet war of nerves in an interview with a New York *Times* correspondent. He said, "If war breaks out in the Middle East, we are here and you"—meaning the United States—"are not." "When the guns begin firing, the rockets can begin flying." That, may I say, is a statement which is both offensive and, insofar as its insinuation of United States impotence is concerned, is also untrue. Let's get that clear. In another statement on the same day Mr. Khrushchev cautioned Turkey that Turkey had few troops with which to defend its border with the Soviet Union, and he again threatened to bombard Turkey with rocket missiles. These very same threats were repeated by Mr. Gromyko on Tuesday [October 22].

Finally, the Communist leaders of the Soviet Union actually went so far in their rather breathless eagerness as to send letters to political parties in other countries, which presented the Soviet propaganda line on developments in the Middle East and exhorted these parties to support Soviet policies in this region. Is this the noninterference which Mr. Gromyko had in mind in the resolution on "peaceful coexistence" which he introduced on September 28?¹⁵

Through all these maneuvers the Soviet Union set what it believed to be the proper stage for the charges it was engineering to bring before the United Nations.

Soviet Middle East Policies

All these actions of the Soviet Union should be seen against the background of Soviet Middle East policies and actions during the past two decades.

Soviet ambitions in the Middle East entered an active phase in 1939 when Nazi Germany and Communist Russia formed an alliance in the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of unfragrant memory. The Soviet Union in 1940 sought to use this

alliance to establish a sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf and Black Sea regions and proposed to Hitler's foreign minister, Mr. Ribbentrop, that this area be "recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

These ambitions came to nothing, but the Soviet Union nevertheless pressed forward toward the same goals after World War II. It sought trusteeship over Libya. It demanded that Turkey cede to it the districts of Kars and Ardahan and grant the Soviet Union a naval base at the Dardanelles. That is what the Soviet Union demanded. It occupied northern Iran in opposition of international agreements, and only the staunch stand taken by the United Nations and the will of free countries caused Soviet forces to be withdrawn from that region.

The year 1955 was marked by renewed Soviet efforts. It seems clear that the Soviet Union then reached the decision to concentrate its attention on the Middle East and the free countries of Asia. Its tactics are clear. First it seeks to expand its influence by psychological exploitation of legitimate national aspirations, even if this requires the temporary repudiation of local Communist parties. Then it resorts to subversion as gains are registered. And, finally, it hopes to seize and consolidate power through indirect aggression.

Now the Soviet Government pretends to believe that the United States is "prodding" Turkey to attack Syria. While it does not really believe this charge, it has spread it across the world and into this forum. I therefore reaffirm to you all: The United States is pushing no country into war; we are steadfastly against aggression in any form and from any quarter.

What we are entitled to ask is the real explanation for the behavior of the Soviet Union. All the evidence shows what its true aims are:

1. By creating the appearance of threat to Syria's security and then pretending to remove the threat, they want to pose before the world as the savior of the Arabs.
2. They want to bully Turkey with threats of extinction and frighten the rest of us, if you please, into doing nothing.
3. They evidently believe that their agents and sympathizers inside Syria will make political gains from the artificial threat of war which has been generated.

¹⁵ For a statement by Ambassador Lodge on the Soviet item on "peaceful coexistence," see *ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1957, p. 693.

4. They want to blacken the name of the United States and to destroy the friendship which has existed historically between the people of the Middle East and the United States.

5. Finally, by creating an artificial war scare the Soviet Government hopes to further its expansionist purposes and, in accordance with its historic aim, reduce the Middle East to the status of the captive nations of Eastern Europe.

Record of Soviet Behavior

So there, Mr. President, are the facts and the conclusions about Soviet intentions which flow inescapably from the facts and from what they themselves have said, because none of this is my rhetoric. This is all taken from the record. It is this same Soviet Government, the author of this unlovely record, which now seeks to accuse the great peace-loving majority of non-Communist nations in the world of being warmongers. That is what is happening.

Here is a government which has been condemned by the United Nations three times in the past year for its actions in Hungary; which has violated the expressed wishes of the United Nations more than 30 times in the past 8 years; which has abused its United Nations veto power 82 times—accusing the overwhelming majority of the human race of wanting war.

Here is the government most often defeated in the United Nations operating on the maxim of the old political boss who says: "Claim everything; concede nothing; and if defeated allege fraud."

Here is the chronic lawbreaker, not only seeking to be regarded as a good citizen, but actually trying to sit in the judge's seat and sentence the whole law-abiding community to jail.

Here is the arsonist, trying his best to start another fire and demanding the right to lead the fire brigade.

Here is the man in the parade who cannot ever keep step, exclaiming, "Everybody is out of step but me."

Remember that it was one year ago to this day that Soviet tanks were shooting down Hungarian freedom fighters in the streets of Budapest. Compare the Soviet defiance of the demands of this Assembly that it desist from its butchery of Hungary with the actions which many other members of the United Nations, including my own

country, took a few years earlier when they shed their blood in defense of the principles of the charter in Korea, shed their blood while the Soviet Union was actively directing and aiding the aggressor. As one speaker said here in the Assembly at that time, the Soviets were fighting to the last Chinese.

Remember, too, the complaints of Iran in 1946 and of Greece in 1947.

Remember the so-called "charges" which the Soviet Union has brought before the General Assembly year after year and which have been dismissed by overwhelming votes—what we call here "the Soviet item."

Remember the recent assassination by a Communist fanatic of President Carlos Castillo Armas of Guatemala, a man who once addressed the Assembly from this very rostrum, and remember the terroristic Communist bombing of Saigon only the other day. These acts remind us of the methods the Soviet Union is prepared to use.

What a tragedy it is that the Soviet Government pursues a policy so unworthy of the great creative abilities of its people! The distinguished achievements of Soviet scientists, which deserve and receive our hearty congratulations, prove how much the Soviet Union could contribute to humanity if the policies of its government were truly directed toward peace and cooperation. Let us hope that we here in this room, within our lifetime, will see an advance in Soviet policies which will reflect the fundamental decency of the people in the Soviet Union.

Aspirations of Arab Nations

Mr. President, the matters which we are discussing here today, while of concern to all those devoted to freedom, are of direct importance to the Arab States and to the Arab peoples. The Arab peoples aspire for closer relationships with one another. This aspiration for unity is accompanied by an equally strong desire for equality within the family of nations.

The United States, which was formed by the voluntary union of individual States, recognizes and respects the aspirations of the Arab nations. To Americans there is a grandeur in freedom and in unity. We respect that nation that is truly free and independent. We respect those who, of their own free will, join together for their common good. In our relationships with other na-

tions we believe sincerely that our interests and their interests are best served when we meet as equals. We want this for ourselves; we want it for all others. With the same fervor we shall stand with our Arab friends to oppose those who would seek to rob them of their liberty and twist their hopes of progress to serve the aims of a new imperialism.

On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower stated to the Congress of the United States:¹⁶

We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. . . . There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude.

Mr. President, as I conclude, let me say this: The United States will not be stopped by threats or by defamation from continuing to offer its understanding and support to those nations of the Middle East which are being threatened by the Soviet Union and whose independence the Soviet Union seeks to destroy. Let there be no question about our capacity to offer this support. We are strong, and our allies are strong. And let us not forget here, in this room, that the charter of the U.N. is a most powerful "grand alliance" against aggression. It could well become the most powerful alliance that the world has ever seen.

The United Nations has played a big part in thwarting the many Soviet power grabs since the end of the Second World War. We should not be discouraged; we must be optimistic. Just look at what I refer to:

I have in mind the failure of the Soviet Union to gain its demand that Turkey cede the districts of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union.

I have in mind the withdrawal of Soviet troops from northern Iran.

I have in mind the ending of the Communist encroachment on Greece.

I have in mind the Communist attempt to conquer Korea by force of arms.

I have in mind the thwarting of the Communist attempt to expand all through Central America, using Guatemala as a base.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1957, p. 83.

Thus the true facts, and the motives behind these charges, are perfectly clear for all who wish to see. The United States welcomes examination by the Assembly of this situation. The United States is confident that such consideration will be most helpful in placing developments in proper perspective and in reducing the tensions which the enemies of peace and tranquillity in the Middle East have sought to build up around this matter.

Mr. President, we will uphold the charter and have faith in God.¹⁷

Department Views on Expulsion of Marshal Zhukov

Following is the text of a Department statement read to news correspondents on November 2 by Lincoln White, Chief of the News Division.

The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, after what appears to have been extended debate, has reported the expulsion of former Defense Minister Zhukov from the party's Presidium and Central Committee. As earlier speculation had indicated, the announcement states that issues involved were party controls over the army and Zhukov's pursuit of a personal "cult of personality." The announcement goes on to accuse Zhukov of a disposition to "adventurism" in foreign policy.

There has no doubt been adventurism in foreign policy as witness the recent Soviet threats to Turkey and the fabricated charges disseminated by Soviet spokesmen regarding the Middle East. However, the placing of responsibility for this adventurism upon Zhukov is difficult to reconcile with the recently expressed desire of Mr. Khrushchev to entrust Marshal Zhukov with a mission of high trust and confidence to the United States.

This ouster and attempt to disgrace a distinguished military leader, so quickly following the similar actions against Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov, is evidence of the strains and stresses that must be present within the Soviet bloc.

¹⁷ On Nov. 1 the General Assembly agreed to close the debate on the Syrian complaint without taking any action.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of October 29

Press release 601 dated October 29

Secretary Dulles: Any questions, ladies and gentlemen?

Q. Mr. Secretary, what can you give us in the way of factual information on the Zhukov mystery, and what interpretation do you make about this development in relation to Soviet foreign policy?

Issues To Be Resolved in U.S.S.R.

A. I am not going to make any predictions as to what is going to be the outcome of what is going on in the Soviet Union at the present time. I think that the prolonged sessions of the Central Committee, which presumably is still in session, indicate that there must be issues of very considerable importance that are sought to be resolved by that meeting. I think that it is possible to see perhaps some of the background which probably leads to the sharp issues that are undoubtedly being dealt with there, and I would be glad to comment a moment or two about that aspect of the matter.

You have, first of all, a duality in the political system within the Soviet Union which is prone to pulling and hauling in different directions. You have the party system, and you have the governmental system. The top position, of course, of authority within the Soviet Union is the head of the Soviet Communist Party. That position is now held by Khrushchev. Then you have the head of the state, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. In general, as Stalin said, no important decision is taken by the Soviet, that is, the state, except under the guiding direction of the party. But the degree of control, and in what detail the party exercises its authority over the state, that is constantly a shifting problem, except when you have one man who holds both positions, as was the case when Stalin held both positions. Then you have

the secret police, and then you have the army. There is a constant tugging and hauling as between them. Of course, Stalin also had control of the secret police through Beria, and the influence of the army was depressed during that period.

Now, that led to what was called the "cult of personality." Ostensibly they have been trying to get rid of that. But as they try to get rid of that unification of all this influence in one man, then inevitably pulling and hauling takes its place.

Then you also have as background the fact that undoubtedly there are extremely serious domestic issues to be resolved. The scrapping of the current Five Year Plan is probably, certainly from the domestic standpoint, the most serious step that has been taken within the Soviet Union for a long, long time. That step could not have been taken except under the impact of very powerful economic forces which made it impossible even to pretend to carry on this Five Year Plan, and those plans are almost sacred symbols within the Soviet Union.

You have the problem of decentralization of industry, which raises very great problems indeed.

Then you surely have the problem of the claimants from different sources upon available resources. There is the need now to help bolster up the satellites, give aid to Communist China. There is a sort of so-called Soviet foreign aid program. You have the claimants for better living conditions within Russia. Certainly you have claimants from the military. Undoubtedly there are the same issues that are present in this country, whether you are going to have a big bomber program, whether you are going to go in for guided missiles, whether you are going to go to these long-range new weapons in replacement to some extent of your standing army.

All of these issues are inherent in the situation. So, while these dictatorships always, or usually, seem to present a hard, calm exterior, there go on within them terrific convulsions. There are inherent the same kinds of problems that we deal with openly. Often, in fact, those problems become exaggerated within a despotism as they are tried to be sealed off. Well, that is a rather long statement for background, but I don't want to go much further than that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you suggesting that there is a terrific convulsion under way now at this time, that perhaps the secret police is coming back into more authority than it has had?

A. No. I don't want to have my remarks interpreted as going beyond what I have said. I have tried to point out what are the underlying problems that are faced within the Soviet Union and that probably these problems, or some of them, are coming to a head at the present time, and I don't know what the solution is going to be. I do think that probably the problems that are up for resolution relate more to domestic issues than they do to international problems.

Q. Mr. Secretary, continuing that thought that you just left, would it be possible for you to analyze, or at least conjecture, whether domestic problems are so severe that they shape Russia's approach to international problems more than not, or if the converse is true? If I make my question clear?

A. I would think that the dominant characteristic at the present time is the domestic problem. As I say, the dual problem of the scrapping of the current Five Year Plan, and the decentralization of industry and moving its control away from Moscow into the provinces, and so forth—that undoubtedly creates tremendous problems. Also you undoubtedly have, as I say, the claimants—which, in part, represent the military—to resources which are inadequate to meet all of the needs. Now, I wouldn't ever disguise or ignore the possibility that you cannot make a sharp line of distinction between internal troubles and external troubles, and sometimes, as we know, external policies are stiffened and become provocative in an effort to divert attention away from domestic troubles. That is always a possibility which we must constantly be alert to.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a general impression since the Russians launched their earth satellite that they were in pretty good shape. Now, from what you have given as background in answer to the first question, are you suggesting that they are not in as good shape as is popularly supposed?

A. Well, they are in good shape from the standpoint of having pushed science rapidly. Their body of learning and their knowledge about applications of that learning are undoubtedly of a very high order, and nothing that I have said should be considered in derogation of their scientific and military achievements, which are very great. But launching a satellite, while it demonstrates great scientific skill, doesn't give you the answer as to how you make your income go around or as to whether or not you can maintain a Five Year Plan. It doesn't solve any of the problems that I have talked about and which we have known for some time were causing a great deal of hauling and pulling within the Soviet Union. Mr. Allen Dulles made a talk about that in San Francisco a few weeks ago,¹ in which he developed all these angles, I think, quite adequately.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the Eisenhower-Macmillan communique² there was a reference to what is called the inexorable law of evolutionary process in totalitarian countries. Do you believe that this will go on if, as it would appear, Khrushchev manages to get all the power elements under his control?

A. Yes, I feel so. We pointed out that there are two ways in which the law works—one is through peaceful evolution and the other is through violent revolution, and I do not think that the working of that law in one way or another, perhaps a combination of the two, can be stayed by merely reshuffling the internal authority. You may be able to cope better with some manifestations, but, as you repress in one place, you are apt to have an outburst in another place.

Now, of course, we did not suggest by that statement that this law was going to work overnight. On the contrary, our statement made perfectly clear that we considered that we had to gird ourselves for what might be a very long struggle.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 21, 1957, p. 639.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1957, p. 739.

I have at times talked about this decade as a period within which we could see some material progress made. Perhaps that is overoptimistic. Maybe a generation. I don't know. But this is not something that is going to happen overnight, nor is it anything in my opinion that can be stopped merely by personnel changes within the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Secretary, from what you know, can you tell us whether there is a power struggle now going on in Moscow and, if so, who is on top as of the moment?

A. No. I cannot answer those questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you share the thesis on which President Tito seems to base his policy, that Mr. Khrushchev is still the paramount exponent of the liberal trend in the Soviet hierarchy at this moment?

A. I wouldn't want to comment on President Tito's views because I don't know them with sufficient intimacy and I don't know just what his statement is that you allude to. I would say that, from where we sit here at least, we have not felt any great liberality, although there has been a measure of tolerance—of some tolerance at least within Poland—perhaps a greater measure of tolerance than would have existed under Stalin. But in the main we do not see any great evidence of liberalization. Certainly, the conduct of the Hungarian affair was not characterized by any willingness to see liberty exercised by the Hungarian people.

Situation in the Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you relate these events in Moscow with our position now vis-a-vis the Middle East? Are things worse, better, or what?

A. I'm not quite sure that I get the import of your question. Would you repeat it?

Q. Well, I mean the Russians have been making moves into the Middle East, have, in fact, moved in economically into Syria through a treaty. That is happening while there has been an internal struggle in Moscow. Meanwhile they have been very busy outside, in the United Nations and down here too. I just wondered if you had noted any toughening of their position in these diplomatic excursions, or do they seem more

amenable to talk? How do you balance, for example, the Zaroubin talks and offer of 52 points of contact³ with Communist forces starting a war in the Middle East? I mean it doesn't seem to make much sense right now.

A. Well, Soviet propaganda has never been characterized by consistency, you know, and they say one thing in one part of the world and at the same time they say something quite contradictory in another part of the world, and they can carry on what would appear to be contrary policies at one and the same time. The Soviet desire to get into the Middle East is, of course, nothing new. The degree of influence that they now exert in Syria is a new development. I would say, in the main, the impression we have is that the Soviets have been talking, at least, much more toughly than has been customary in recent years. And the kind of charges that the Soviet Union has made at the United Nations and that Gromyko made in his press conference before he came to the United Nations—that is characterized by very tough language indeed.

Q. Is the administration considering a vast economic aid program in the Middle East to counter-balance Communist influence in that area and prevent further Soviet domination there?

A. We have no vast program of economic assistance to the Middle East in contemplation. I said at the United Nations in my speech up there⁴ that, if there could be in sight a solution of some of these political problems, concurrently we would contribute through an economic aid program of various kinds. I have repeatedly said that I stood by the principles expressed in my August 1955 speech on that subject,⁵ which would involve expenditures running into a lot of money. But I would not say that there is at the moment any concrete project of the kind that you allude to.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with Soviet influence in Syria there were reports the other day that the Soviet Ambassador in Damascus had influenced the Syrians to change their minds about having King Saud mediate. Do you have any comment on that?

³ See p. 800.

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1957, p. 555.

⁵ Ibid., Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

A. I would give very considerable credence to that report.

Allied Defense Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the Eisenhower-Macmillan communique it was stated that the very fundamental basis of our allied defense policy is out of date, and at your last press conference you suggested that it became out of date when Russia proved that we no longer had a monopoly of the atomic bomb. Can you tell us why it is that, when that event took place some years ago, the administration delayed some 4 years before initiating or taking the initiative to initiate the new look that we have now just seemed to agree on starting?

A. The tendency to be secretive is a very deep one and is held, I think, by the Congress, and the problem of getting changes there has been one of considerable difficulty, and I am not sure, even now, it will be possible to get all the changes that seem required. But I think that the demonstration that the Soviet Union has made such great progress may lead to a feeling that we take more risks by not sharing with our allies than the risks that we take in keeping, trying to keep, all these things to ourselves.

You have to find the climate in which to do these things. There are a lot of things that are theoretically desirable, and recognized as such, but the climate is not such so that you can actually do them. In these matters timing is an essential ingredient in any course of action.

Q. Are you suggesting, Mr. Secretary, that the secrecy was all on the part of Congress—the impulse toward secrecy? Our understanding has been that the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Strauss, is the man who favors secrecy more than any other person connected with atomic-energy matters.

A. Well, I would say that there were, perhaps, some nuances of difference within the administration itself on this question of secrecy. (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, to pursue it just a bit further. We are talking about timing here, but I mean this policy could very well mean the difference between life and death of the Atlantic Alliance, if it is, indeed, a fundamental part of

our defense policy. The question arises, why wouldn't the administration have taken the leadership and fought doggedly on the Hill, wherever it was necessary to take the steps, instead of waiting for a propitious time or instead of waiting for Russia to kind of propel us into this particular course of action?

A. Well, there hadn't been complete unanimity of agreement. I recall that as late as in the spring of '53 former President Truman said that he still did not believe that the Soviet Union had atomic bombs, and—

Q. He wasn't President then?

A. I beg pardon?

Q. '53?

A. Yes. I think the statement he made—I think in January 1953—was that he did not believe, in fact, that the Soviet Union yet had the atomic bomb, and that what had been exploded up to that time was merely a so-called atomic device but they had not yet found the way to use atomic energy in terms of a weapon.

Essentials of Interdependence

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the communique with Macmillan—the talk of sharing tasks and burdens—sometime ago you told us that you expected to have, I believe before this date, a report on overseas bases and manpower overseas—American. Are those two things related, and has that report come to a head?

A. The report is, I think, in the final stages of preparation at the present time, and I already have a rough forecast as to what probably the findings will be; that is, just in terms of its general scope. I would not say that there was any interconnection really between the two things. The timing—the fact that the timing comes together is just a coincidence. I think that as we face—each of us, each of our allies—this problem of defense and the cost of defense and the problem of bearing it in a way which is compatible with the maintenance of sound economy and sound currency, over a period of years, we are more and more driven to accept the view that we must be more interdependent and not each try for an independence which would force each

country to do itself everything, in terms of ground forces, air, navy, modern weapons, missiles, bombers, and the like. Now we just cannot each of us do that; even a nation as powerful as the United States cannot successfully do it alone and help our allies to be doing the same thing. I think we have got to accept the implications of an era of interdependence.

Now you cannot practice interdependence without having a greater degree of knowledge and confidence and political closeness with each other. The concept of interdependence means that you depend upon somebody else for at least some part of your defense. And as soon as you get to have to depend upon somebody else, you want to be quite sure that that other person is dependable and, in fact, is doing his part and will make the correct political decisions at the right time, so that the parts of this thing will all move together.

Now that is really the problem that we confront and probably will be a principal issue dealt with at the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council, and, of course, it affects other security arrangements besides the North Atlantic Council.

You will recall that in the communique it speaks of the necessity of our cooperating and working together and then points out that, in order that this shall actually work, there must be three ingredients that are mentioned there, and which I consider extremely important: First, there must be more knowledge on the part of each of what the other is doing in terms of his sector of responsibility. Secondly, there must be confidence that the element of defense which each is responsible for will, in fact, be used when the critical moment comes. Thirdly, there must be confidence that it will not be misused, so as perhaps, unnecessarily, to get us all embroiled in a war without adequate reasons.

I do not think that our existing political-military mechanisms are adequate to cover those three points at the present time. If you are going to have interdependence, different sectors are going to be assumed by different countries. You will have to bring about as a supplement to that these three things: greater knowledge; greater confidence of use at the right time; and increased insurance against misuse at the wrong time.

Now that is the thing we are going to have to try to work out and I think that will be one of

the important matters dealt with at the next NATO meeting, and, of course, the pattern we work out there would always, I suppose, be one which we would consider with relation to the SEATO and other security arrangements.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you believe this might be worked out? Do you need some new mechanism, something to be superimposed on each or all?

A. I don't care to make any forecast at this time as to what conclusions we would come to as to how to work these matters out. They are being studied; in fact, they have been studied for some little time within our own Government. They will have to be studied with our allies on a very tentative basis, and I doubt whether we will have any concrete thoughts on this matter to make public until we have had an opportunity to develop our own thinking somewhat more and to exchange views with some of our principal allies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I change the subject? I would like to know if you see, with respect to gifts to American officials, any difference in kind between a wrist watch, an automobile, and a deep freeze? (Laughter)

A. Yes, I can.

Q. I mean in "kind," not degree.

A. I can see considerable differences.

Q. In kind?

A. Well, I don't know what you mean.

Q. There are gifts from people who have an interest in good relations with the important people in the United States Government.

A. I think this question of gifts is a very difficult one and it is one on which it is very difficult to generalize.

Q. There has been a great deal of generalization about it from time to time in each administration. There is nothing peculiar about this.

A. I don't recall that I have ever generalized about it, and I would just like to say this: I do not think there is any problem of greater difficulty and delicacy than the problem of knowing how to handle gifts. There are some gifts where you can handle them very easily, where you can detect in the gift a desire to gain an improper influence; in

such a case, you return the gift, and I have frequently myself done that. In most cases gifts are an act of courtesy—an act of friendliness—and a rejection of the gift would involve ill will, would be a discourteous thing to do. Some gifts I myself compensate for by personally giving gifts in return of somewhat comparable value; some I turn over to the State Department—I turn over a lot. Practically anything that comes to Mrs. Dulles or me comes to the State Department to use if, as we hope, in the new building we may have sort of a museum there. Others are received and kept because there doesn't seem to be any other good solution to the problem. Anybody who thinks that this question of gifts is a simple one doesn't understand the problem.

The United States itself gives gifts. If we thought all giving of gifts was an evil practice, then the first place to stop would be to stop ourselves. But whenever important persons come here, or whenever we make visits of importance, we take gifts along because that is the courteous, decent, nice thing to do. And to draw the line as to when a gift is properly given, and properly received, and it isn't, is something which nobody can determine in advance by some rigid rule. It largely is a question of the judgment, delicacy of judgment, of the persons involved.

Q. Do you think that it might be helpful to have gifts publicly announced or listed or categorized at the time?

A. I doubt very much—

Q. Because how is the public to know whether people are exercising what I believe you would regard as good taste. You put it on a basis of good taste and motive, which are very, very nebulous characteristics—they are very important, but nebulous.

A. I don't think the nebulosity would be dispelled by a list. (Laughter)

Q. People would know what had been offered and what had been received, and then the person who took it would be in the position of justifying it. Isn't that true?

A. Let me ask, would you put a valuation on these gifts?

Q. Well, I am not Secretary of State, sir.

A. No, but you are making a proposal.

Q. For your opinion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I return to Russia for a moment and ask this question? Is this tugging and hauling that is going on in the Russian hierarchy, is that good news or bad news to the West, and does it increase the probability of war?

A. I don't think I can answer that question. I don't know whether it is good news or bad news because so far there isn't any news on this particular affair. It's all so far in the realm of speculation. After the outcome is known, then we may be able to judge it. But, in anticipation, I wouldn't want to make a guess on that matter.

Division of Responsibilities

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to NATO, are we proposing that the allies furnish the men and we will furnish the money and the weapons?

A. No. The division will not be along any hard and fast line of that sort. Broadly speaking, we believe that the forward position should in the main be held by local manpower. But not exclusively so. And there is no suggestion at all, for example, that American forces should be pulled out of forward positions in Europe.

Q. How about Asia, sir?

A. Or in Asia, for that matter. The only place there where we have manpower in forward positions at the present time is in Korea, where I think we have about two divisions. And there is no thought of denuding Korea of American divisions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what effect do you see the Eisenhower-Macmillan agreements having on defense spending in this country?

A. I do not think that it will involve any reduction in the defense spending. But I think it may mean the releasing of some funds for purposes which we can carry forward with greater efficiency and more in the common good, and possibly the assumption of specific responsibility by the British, the French, or the Germans, or others in certain other areas, so that we sort of dovetail together.

Now, the result of that should be, when it gets going, to relieve us of certain burdens and to relieve them of certain burdens. Whether the re-

lief will reflect itself in a reduced budget or whether it will mean that the money will go into other forms of military activity or not, I can't foresee at the moment. I do not contemplate that it would affect any reduction of our budget for the next year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that President Eisenhower may attend the NATO meeting in December. From your vantage point, sir, do you think it would be unlikely for him to attend?

A. Well, I think, if he were invited, he would certainly give it sympathetic consideration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would this involve any change in the plans of President del Campo, [President Ibañez del Campo of Chile] who is to come here I believe on December 11th or 12th? If the President should go to Paris on December 15, would that require any change in the status of the official visit of Del Campo?

A. I feel quite confident that, if the President went, he would go under conditions where it would fit in with such existing engagements and would not involve dislodging any of those.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was the real reason for the transfer of Mr. Purse, the Deputy Chief of the Protocol Division?

A. I think there was a statement given out on that matter yesterday.⁶ I have nothing to add to that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in mentioning the NATO December meeting, you referred also to application to SEATO and other alliances.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you feel that arrangements made at the December meeting will also apply to other defense arrangements?

A. There will be no automatic application to other alliances of what is agreed upon at NATO. Each of these alliances is independent of the other. But if we work out a solution, an application, of certain principles which are of universal applicability, then the experience we gain in that way may enable us to apply those principles also more readily in the other areas.

⁶ Press release 599 dated Oct. 28; not printed here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you welcome the appointment of Marshal Zhukov as Ambassador to Washington? (Laughter)

A. Well, you know the practice is that, before an ambassador is appointed, we are asked for an *agrément* and that request for an *agrément* goes to the President and the President makes the decision.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when West Germany broke relations with Yugoslavia some time ago over the Yugoslav recognition of the East Germany regime, there was fear expressed in some quarters that the Yugoslav action would start a sort of chain reaction in other countries, especially the neutral nations, in recognizing the de facto government. How do you feel about the chain reaction, and what if anything can we do about it?

A. I haven't seen any evidence of a chain reaction. I doubt if there will be a chain reaction. I think possibly the action that the Federal Republic took may tend to slow down any such reaction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your view that this new effort at cooperation among the allied nations is essentially a political problem, or is it a military problem? You seem to be stressing the political side, where you foresee no real change in our deployment overseas.

A. I think it, like most of these problems, has both political and military aspects. I suppose from a military aspect the first thing to do would be to sort of divide up the task more clearly than is the case today and to allocate the military responsibilities. Then, having done that, you need, in order to make it effective, some new political understandings or arrangements so that that will be acceptable and will work. Now, just to give a concrete illustration:

It is logical that the United States should do the primary work in terms of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery at long range. We have a great advance over any other allied country in that respect, and it would seem to be an improvident concept of the common fund to have duplications attempted. On the other hand, if that is not going to be attempted, I think there has to be a greater knowledge, first, as to what those capabilities are; secondly, as I said, the confidence that in time of emergency, of

armed attack, they would in fact be used; and, thirdly, confidence that they will not be misused.

In other words, we should try to get as closely as we can to the concept which is referred to in our Constitution as the creation as between the states of a "common defense." It involves all of those elements. It's a joint political-military problem, as I see it.

The Concept of Collective Security

Q. Mr. Secretary, you yourself, sir, have reemphasized on many occasions the importance and the value of the military pacts that we have made with our allies—notably SEATO, NATO, and the Baghdad Pact. Do not the Macmillan-Eisenhower talks boil down—if you will permit the phrase—to an agonizing reappraisal of the entire validity of this kind of system? And if that is so, how do you equate the implication that was attributed to you at your last news conference about the complacency of the American public contrasted with the alertness of the administration?

A. That is a pretty long question. I'm not quite sure where to pick it up. Certainly nothing that has been said in the Eisenhower-Macmillan communique leads, I think, to the conclusion that we regard our mutual security arrangements as obsolete. Indeed, the implication sought to be given, and I hope given, is that they are more than ever indispensable. But I have talked here repeatedly, here and elsewhere, of the fact that we need in the society of nations to move constantly ever closer to the concept of collective security that we have within the nation. I have repeatedly talked about the fact that within a nation you give up very quickly the idea of the frontier, where every man protects his own house with his own gun and his own dog, and you move forward toward a concept of where there is a central police authority and that is accepted because it gives better security than anything else.

Now, in the society of nations we have never gotten toward that. As the communique said, the theoretically ideal way to move toward it would be through the United Nations. That was originally the concept of the United Nations that is expressed in article 43, that the Security Council have available these forces which it would use to help to maintain order and to give

a confidence of security in the world. That has always been vitiated by the Soviet veto. So you have to move toward it as best you can with those who accept that concept.

And you need more and more to have the concept that this force is, as the communique says in reference to nuclear weapons, a sort of a trust to be used for the benefit of all of those who share in the program.

Now, there are other elements which also must be a trust, created by other nations. We are trying to build this as near as we can to the concept of a really central security force which exists for the benefit of all, to which all contribute fairly, and in which all can have equal confidence.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you suggesting that the United States will accept supranational authority over the armed forces to a greater extent than it does now in NATO?

A. No. I am not arguing for any supranational authority. That is, perhaps you might say, theoretically a correct answer to the problem. It is not practical at the present time, and I do not think it is necessary to move in that direction. I think that we can build through relations of trust and confidence where there is knowledge about what goes on. We can build up these essential ingredients that I have pointed out: first, knowledge; second, confidence of proper use; thirdly, confidence that there will be no improper use. I do not think that requires any supranational authority. I think we can achieve needed cooperation, will achieve it, without that.

Q. Mr. Macmillan has talked about the eventuality possibly of a world government resulting out of this drawing together. Do you see anything like that in the ultimate future?

A. I was not aware that he said that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that the United States must be alert to possible international developments as a result of the current tugging and hauling in Moscow?

A. I said that, whenever a great nation seems to be having internal troubles, one has to bear in mind the historical fact that sometimes those internal troubles lead to external acts which are designed to solidify the situation at home or divert attention. We are always on the alert under those conditions.

Q. Are you suggesting, sir, that we have some diplomatic or military alert now in effect while this problem is under way in Moscow at the present time?

A. I think there is nothing special in that respect that requires that. I think that all of our people in the top echelon of Government, military and political, are quite aware of the fact that situations like this sometimes have external manifestations. But I don't want to give you the impression that we think there is war around the corner, because we don't think it is.

Q. Sir, are you issuing any new rules or reminders to the State Department as a result of the Purse incident?

A. Not that I am aware of. I have not followed that particularly.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mutual Security, a Common Defense of Freedom

Remarks by Secretary Dulles¹

Press release 608 dated November 1

You have been hearing about one important part of our foreign policy, the mutual security program. Its purpose, like all of our foreign policy, is to serve the American people, to make us more secure and to help to realize our aspirations.

We face, and indeed every generation faces, grave problems. Today the dominant problem is that created by international communism. It already controls one-third of the world's people, and it seeks to extend that control over all the world. It is prepared to use any means which it thinks will serve that purpose.

This Communist effort may seem to fluctuate in its intensity from time to time. But I can assure you that the pressure is always on to take advantage of any weakness or any relaxing on the part of the free world.

¹ Made on the initial program of "Camera on Washington," a special television series on the functions of the executive branch of the Government. The series began on Nov. 1 and is being carried by the National Broadcasting Co. in cooperation with the Educational Television and Radio Center at Ann Arbor, Mich.

The best, indeed the only, answer to that threat is increased unity of the free nations. Our 13 colonies, when they sought freedom, adopted the principle of collective security. As Benjamin Franklin said at the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately."

If we look even farther back, we recall the frontier days when a family achieved security by always having a gun handy and maybe a faithful dog. But this idea of each defending himself has long since given way to the practice of collective security.

We must have that collective security within that society of free nations. As President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan said just a few days ago,² "The concept of national self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries of the free world are interdependent."

And so it is we work together, each contributing to a common defense. That is one part of our mutual security program.

There is another part. That involves bringing the gospel of freedom to the hundreds of millions of people who have just achieved political independence and who are wondering whether ways of freedom can lift their people out of the age-old morass of hopeless poverty. The Communists claim that they can do this if only the people will accept the dictatorship of a Communist state. We believe that economic uplift can be achieved in freedom. But words alone carry little conviction. We must demonstrate our faith by works.

To do this is part of the great American tradition. I recall that Abraham Lincoln said of our Declaration of Independence that it promised "liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time." It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men.

We believe that our mutual security program, by providing a common defense of freedom and by spreading abroad the gospel of freedom, meets the needs and the aspirations of the American people.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1957, p. 739.

The United Nations: Force for a Better World

by Francis O. Wilcox

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

Very likely most of us here today grew up during an era of American isolationism. We studied history and geography at school and perhaps at college. But, by and large, we were not overly concerned with international problems. There was too much to do at home, and the issues confronting countries thousands of miles away seemed remote, to say the least.

But that was before World War II and the era of the jet plane and the hydrogen bomb. It was before we assumed, albeit reluctantly, our role of leadership in world affairs. It was before the United States and 50 other nations gathered in San Francisco to adopt the United Nations Charter, which was framed to enable them to work together to achieve just and lasting peace.

Today I am filled with a deep sense of appreciation for the opportunity to participate in Iowa's United Nations celebration. For it is my firm belief that the United Nations represents the greatest effort in history to achieve peace and progress for all mankind. It is the only world forum where, in time of crisis, nations can discuss, debate, and mediate conflicts arising among them.

This is of supreme importance in a world where overwhelming power has confronted man with a desperate choice between progress and annihilation, a choice between cooperation on behalf of peace or facing inevitable destruction in a nuclear war.

But we must always bear in mind the fact that the effectiveness of the United Nations depends almost entirely on public understanding and sup-

port for its efforts. Many of you here have done much to encourage the development of this understanding and support. I congratulate you on your contribution to this important effort.

The United Nations Record

Your celebration today marks the 12th anniversary of the United Nations. Twelve years ago there was a great hope that the United Nations would usher in a new era of peace and tranquility. However, this hope was rudely shattered with the advent of the cold war and the growing cleavage between the Soviet Union and the West. The Soviet Union soon made it clear that it had no intention of cooperating in building the kind of peace envisaged by the charter. This struck at the heart of the United Nations system and tended to undermine the very foundation on which collective security was built.

But in spite of the cold war and the bad faith on the part of the Soviet Union the United Nations can look back on a record of solid accomplishment both as a major force in keeping the peace and in removing the causes of war. What has this parliament of nations achieved? Let me remind you of some of its major accomplishments.

By its action, the United Nations:

—played a major role in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran in 1946.

—helped bring to an end the Communist war in Greece.

—condemned the Chinese Communists as aggressors in Korea and fought to roll back aggression there.

—brought about a truce between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.

¹ Address made before the Iowa Association for the United Nations at Des Moines, Iowa, on Oct. 28 (press release 596).

—avoided a major war in the Suez crisis by bringing the pressure of world opinion to bear for a quick end to hostilities.

—condemned the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary and revealed its brutal repression of the Hungarian people's efforts to achieve freedom.

—cleared the Suez Canal and reopened it to the commerce of the world.

—created an International Atomic Energy Agency for the peaceful development of the atom.

—has fought poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance in many lands in order to improve the general well-being of mankind and remove some of the basic causes of war.

Criticisms of the United Nations

In spite of this record of achievement the United Nations is sometimes subject to pretty severe criticisms for its shortcomings. I should like to deal with some of those criticisms, for we Americans ought to be perfectly aware of the limitations of the organization upon which the world has placed so much hope.

At the outset, however, let me remind you that a good many of these criticisms are misdirected. The United Nations remains an organization of sovereign states. And it can do only what its members are willing to have it do. Let us not fall into the trap, therefore, of blaming the United Nations for the weaknesses and shortcomings of its member states.

The Veto

The principal criticism relates to the excessive use of the veto by the Soviet Union. Wherever one goes in the United States, our people seem to agree that this is the chief defect of the United Nations.

It is obvious that the Soviet Union, with 82 vetoes to its discredit, has shockingly abused its privilege as one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Soviet vetoes have blocked the admission of new members. They have prevented the peaceful settlement of disputes. They have frustrated, and in some cases completely hamstrung, the work of the Security Council.

But this does not mean that the United Nations has withered on the vine. Two important ways have been found to bypass the veto and make United Nations peace machinery work in spite of Soviet intransigence.

In the first place, many free-world countries have entered into collective security pacts like the Rio Treaty and the North Atlantic Pact. These pacts, concluded under article 51 of the charter, have served as a constant deterrent to potential aggressors and have added new wings to the United Nations structure.

In the second place, increased emphasis has been placed upon the role of the General Assembly, where the veto does not apply. The prompt and vigorous action which the Assembly took last year with respect to the Middle East and Hungary demonstrates the vitality of that organ as an instrumentality of world peace.

It is clear to me that no single nation should be in a position to block the admission of new members or prevent the peaceful settlement of disputes before the Council. I hope the day may come, therefore, when we can do away with the veto with respect to these matters.

But we should not delude ourselves that the abolition of the veto, even if it could be accomplished, would remedy the ills that beset the United Nations. For the veto is merely a symptom of the cold-war fever that has racked the organization from the beginning. A change in the wording of the charter would not necessarily reduce the fever.

May I make one final point in this connection. I am confident that the American people, no matter how much they deplore the abuse of the veto, would hesitate to give it up with respect to the use of American troops and planes for United Nations enforcement action.

Bloc Voting

This leads us to the second criticism. Some people have expressed the fear that the General Assembly, swollen in size to 82 nations, may act irresponsibly, thus placing in jeopardy the existence of the United Nations. They complain that many of the new states are from Asia and Africa and that they tend to vote together as a bloc, sometimes against the interests of the Western nations.

In a recent speech in London, Sir Winston Churchill called attention to the new role of the General Assembly. "It is certain," he said, "that if the Assembly continues to take its decision on grounds of enmity, opportunism, or merely jealousy and petulance, the whole structure may be brought to nothing."

The facts do not bear out this concern. There is only one bloc of states that consistently vote together; that is the Soviet Union and its satellites. A careful examination of the record will disprove the existence of any Afro-Asian voting bloc. To be sure, the 27 states from Africa and Asia consult together on problems of mutual interest. Sometimes, as might be expected, they vote the same way. But by and large there are many more differences in language, tradition, and culture among the Afro-Asian states than there are similarities.

A survey of the voting record of the 11th General Assembly will illustrate my point. On the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, 10 of the Afro-Asian states—other than China—voted with the United States, 10 voted against us, and 6 abstained. On the resolution condemning Russian intervention in Hungary, 15 voted as we did, none voted against our position, and 11 abstained. On the later resolution providing for the creation of a Special United Nations Committee on Hungary, 19 voted with us, none against us, and 7 abstained.

One other point should be made in this connection. The little states, many of which have only recently won their independence, lean heavily on the United Nations. They look to it for protection and support. They realize, I am sure, that it would be unwise for them to act irresponsibly in any way that would do harm to the organization that is designed to preserve their independence and their integrity.

We should, of course, expect nations with similar views to vote together. Thus far, however, the United States and the rest of the free-world countries have always been able to win Assembly support for important political issues. We can continue to do so if we will do our best to make sure that logic and justice are on our side.

Financing the United Nations

There is a third criticism which deserves far more attention than it has received thus far. That is the inability or the unwillingness of the members of the United Nations to assume their fair share of the financial obligations of the organization. They show up for the votes, the critics argue, but they are inclined to look the other way when the collection plate is passed.

The task of financing the United Nations has, in fact, become increasingly difficult. It may be-

come as serious an obstacle to the successful functioning of the United Nations as the Soviet abuse of the veto power.

Take the challenge presented by the Palestine refugee problem as a case in point. The United Nations desperately needs \$40 million to meet the basic needs of the 947,000 refugees in the Middle East for the next year. That is the equivalent of about 7¢ per refugee per day. But so far only 21 states have pledged a total of \$25½ million. The United States will pay about 70 percent of the bill.

It is true that many states are desperately short of dollars and find even a token contribution difficult. Moreover, some members are thousands of miles from the Middle East and are unable to understand why they should contribute to the upkeep of Palestine refugees when they have thousands of destitute people within their own borders.

But the bald fact remains that, unless the members of the United Nations demonstrate a greater willingness to accept their share of the financial burden involved, this important program could collapse and the cause of world peace would suffer a serious blow.

The future status of the United Nations Emergency Force is in a somewhat similar precarious financial position. That force, which is made up of troops from nine different countries, has done an outstanding job in maintaining peaceful conditions in the Gaza Strip and in the Sharm el-Sheik area. Border incidents between Egypt and Israel have been kept at a minimum, and the renewal of hostilities has been averted.

Although UNEF is one of the cheapest insurance policies for peace the United Nations ever bought, funds for the force have not been forthcoming. As a result its future does not look bright unless governments in capitals all over the world loosen their purse strings within the next few months.

I hope very much the members of the United Nations will respond to the recent call of the Secretary-General for funds. We cannot afford to put a price tag on world peace.

Lack of Enforcement Machinery

Still a fourth criticism of the United Nations relates to its lack of enforcement machinery. An

organization like the United Nations should be endowed with sufficient strength to cope with any crisis that confronts it.

The framers of the charter recognized this need and provided for armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council. But we have never been able to get agreement with the Soviet Union on the nature of the armed forces to be made available, where they should be stationed, and who should command them. As a result the organization lacks the power to enforce its decision.

How can this be remedied? There are many who argue that we will never have an effective collective-defense system unless a truly international police force is created. Others point out that our regional defense pacts, like NATO, have worked with considerable success and that we should move now to develop them into one integrated system. Still others see our best hope in improving the role of the General Assembly in the maintenance of peace.

I do not know for sure where the answer lies. But I do know that the problem is an extremely important one for the future of the United Nations and we must give serious thought to any steps that can be taken to strengthen its enforcement machinery.

The Necessity for the United Nations

Admittedly the United Nations has its shortcomings. We must recognize these shortcomings and do our best to correct them. In doing so, however, we must be careful not to lose sight of the forest because of the trees.

Suppose the nations of the world had attempted to live without a common meetingplace during the past 12 years. Suppose they had no basic charter by which they should conduct themselves. Suppose they had no world machinery for the peaceful settlement of their differences. Suppose they had no truly international forum to air disputes and seek agreements.

If the United Nations had not provided these essentials for peace, then in my judgment the world might not have survived these 12 critical years. The stresses of a divided world have been so intense, the clash of ideologies so sharp, and the destructive power of nuclear weapons so complete that without the unifying force of an inter-

national organization mankind might have destroyed himself.

Let us turn to look now, in some detail, at a few of the more recent achievements of the United Nations.

The Middle East

Nowhere in the world has the United Nations been more effective recently than in the Suez crisis. It was almost exactly a year ago that Egypt was attacked and the organization was faced with its gravest test since the Korean war.

By swift and effective action the United Nations prevented the conflict from mushrooming into a major war. It brought an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt. It cleared the Suez Canal. And peace, however uneasy, was restored to the area.

In my opinion one of the most important results of the United Nations action in the Middle East was the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force.² To this first truly international police force goes the real credit for maintaining peace in the area. It is not in the limelight these days; in fact, I venture to say that few people know much about it. However, because of its vital importance to peace in the Middle East, I would like to review with you its achievements and its possibilities for the future.

The first job in Egypt was to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The second was to see that the cease-fire was maintained. The creation of the United Nations Emergency Force helped to carry out both of these formidable tasks.

I suggest that no one had a right to be optimistic about setting up a United Nations force at that time. Both Israel and Egypt were wary of the political and strategic implications of the presence of such a force. Fortunately, however, the planners who designed UNEF were aware of this. For the plan developed by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld made it abundantly clear that the force was in no way designed "to influence the military balance in the present conflict, and thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict."

Only a few hours after Mr. Hammarskjöld's plan was announced, the shooting stopped and

²For the resolutions setting up the U.N. Emergency Force, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1956, p. 793.

UNEF was established. In order to get the force into the area the country concerned had to give its consent. Thus, UNEF is not a true military force. It has never sought to impose its will on any of the nations concerned. It is present on the territory of Egypt only at the sufferance of the Egyptian Government. Its main function has been to interpose itself and serve as a buffer between two armies.

Perhaps this limited mission has been a disappointment to those who would like to see the United Nations armed with power to enforce its resolutions even against the will of states against whom the resolutions are directed. I do not believe that UNEF should be regarded as a disappointment in any sense. Its mission was to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of troops and to see that the terms of the cease-fire arrangement were observed. It has accomplished this mission.

Indeed, UNEF has accomplished more than this. It has given living proof that men of different nationalities, backgrounds, and religions can work together in harmony to bring about peaceful conditions in a grievously troubled area of the world. It has given proof that, if enough nations of the world will accept a responsibility to keep the peace, machinery can be established to translate individual responsibility into swift collective action.

The success of UNEF has fired the imagination and hopes of those who would like to see a permanent international police force created. We in the Government have given much thought to this possibility. Mr. Hammarskjöld and his staff are also studying the problem. However, the success which UNEF has enjoyed should not be allowed to delude us into thinking that raising another force to meet a future crisis would be an easy job.

One of the chief problems would be the makeup of such a force. In the case of UNEF there was no difficulty in obtaining contributions in the atmosphere of crisis that existed a year ago. A score of countries immediately came forward with offers of troops. The result is a strangely polyglot but remarkably well integrated body of men. There are differences in language, military discipline, and organization. There are, of course, other problems as well. One of the most

difficult to solve is the feeding of the troops. For example, the menu of the Indian battalion includes meat on the hoof and many exotic spices. The joint Danish and Norwegian battalion requires quantities of smoked salami, sardines, and a special issue of blue cheese.

With all these differences the troops have developed a remarkable *esprit de corps* and a sense of being part of an important and essential operation. Their morale is high.

The United Nations is not often able to point to results as concrete as those which it achieved in the Middle East. The General Assembly achieved these results only through the generation of tremendous moral force. It was that moral force symbolized by a blue United Nations armband worn by the UNEF troops that made its mission successful.

The U.N. and Hungary

I come now to the question of Hungary. I do not propose to review the well-known events beginning with the spontaneous thrust for freedom of the Hungarian people almost a year ago.

What I want to do here is to assess the significance of these historic events and the role of the United Nations in them. The brutal tactics employed by the Soviet Union remain deeply engraved in the minds of us all. Nevertheless I am convinced that the United Nations, acting as the conscience of the free world, has advanced the cause of peace and freedom by its actions on this matter.

How can this conclusion be justified? First of all, the United Nations was able to take certain actions to improve the situation in Hungary and the lot of the Hungarian people. I mention in this connection the flow of supplies of medicines and food to the beleaguered populace of Hungary and the humanitarian care for the flood of refugees who poured across the frontiers. Moreover, when the General Assembly called for an end to mass deportations from Hungary, many who had been deported were returned to their homes and the wave of deportation substantially diminished.

In the second place, the effect on the United Nations as an organization devoted to human freedom was enormous. The Hungarian episode has shown the readiness of representatives of

small countries to inquire fearlessly into an important issue despite the fact that they were challenging a ruthless great power on a matter considered vital to its own security. The overwhelming endorsement by the General Assembly of the report of the Special Committee on Hungary,³ including a condemnation of the Soviet Union, strengthened the moral fiber of the United Nations.

Finally, we must consider the effects of Hungary on the Soviet Union itself and the power complex and the party apparatus which it controls. Here I can say without reservation that the United Nations actions on Hungary have dealt a body blow to the Soviet Union and its satellite system. Consider the crippling effect on Communist parties in Western Europe. In France, Italy, and elsewhere, individuals who had faithfully served the Communist machine for years were unable to stomach the brutal suppression of Hungarian freedom. They could not reconcile this brutality with principles which their culture and heritage had instilled in them.

Nor has the lesson of Hungary been lost upon the leaders of the Kremlin. Where must they now anticipate a new Hungary? Where in the satellite areas subject to their control can they be sure that Communist doctrine has been able to make a people truly subservient to them? Above all, can they rely with any degree of certainty on the loyalty and the support of military forces within the satellite states? These are questions which must keep the men in the Kremlin awake at night.

To me the most significant result of the Hungarian revolution is that it revealed to the world with unmistakable clarity that Soviet Communist domination cannot be indefinitely imposed on a people and any attempt to do so must be buttressed by force.

Nor has the United Nations forgotten the plight of Hungary. It has appointed Prince Wan of Thailand as its Special Representative to continue efforts to achieve the objectives of the U. N. in that unhappy land. Thus far his repeated requests to visit Hungary in pursuit of these U.N. objectives have met with blunt refusals. We continue to hope that Prince Wan will be given the opportunity to accomplish his mission.

³ U.N. doc. A/3592 dated June 12.

This is my evaluation of the meaning of Hungary to the United Nations. In this matter I conclude that the United Nations has well served the cause of peace.

The Picture on Disarmament

Another problem which has consumed a great deal of United Nations time and energy is the search for disarmament. This is the most important problem which faces us in the field of international relations today.

It is true that the production of nuclear weapons goes on and the terrible threat of nuclear warfare casts a deep shadow over mankind. It is also true that we have not yet succeeded in agreeing on a workable disarmament plan. But this is no reason to give up hope or slacken our efforts. On the contrary, if we can only inch ahead, that is still progress. We must seize every opportunity for genuine accord with the Soviet Union. But we must not be trapped into confusing tempting promises with genuine proposals.

Our position in the General Assembly is basically this: We are willing and even anxious to take steps toward arms control. But it is absolutely necessary that any agreement reached include an adequate system of inspection for the purpose of verifying that obligations are fulfilled. We cannot rely on mere promises.

We believe that, with the access of inspectors to the territories of nations, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for a nation to launch a major surprise attack. Potential aggressors usually count on being able to deliver a quick knockout blow. If this could be prevented, the danger of war would be greatly reduced.

We also believe the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries can be controlled.

Finally, we believe that the heavy burden of armament in the world can be safely reduced once the threat of surprise attack has been diminished.

To achieve these objectives we have proposed that both the United States and the Soviet Union throw their territories open to inspection. If that is not acceptable—and it does not appear to be—then we would be willing to start with a more limited zone, such as the area within the Arctic Circle, an additional part of Eastern Siberia, Kamchatka, and Alaska. We have also expressed

our willingness to stop the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing stockpiles by gradually transferring nuclear materials to peaceful purposes. These, together with offers to reduce our armed forces, are practical proposals toward effective disarmament.

The nub of the problem remains the question of establishing an effective inspection and control mechanism. We have contended that any disarmament plan is a sham and a delusion unless it is accompanied by some means of verifying that the parties are living up to their promises. But so far, at least, the Soviet Union has been inclined to shy away from any *effective* system of inspection and control. Mr. Khrushchev put the Soviet position clearly when he suggested that the United States should not try to look in everybody's bedroom and everybody's garden.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union does its best to capitalize on the fear that people have of nuclear war by advancing propaganda proposals. They talk about outlawing the atomic and hydrogen bombs. They propose to halt the testing of nuclear weapons but are unwilling to stop their manufacture. They talk of drastic reduction in the levels of armed forces but shy away from measures needed to verify those reductions. There is a great deal of talk but relatively little in the way of workable, good-faith proposals.

More recently the U.S.S.R. seems prepared to accept the idea of *both* an aerial and a ground inspection system. Theoretically, at least, this is progress. But we have not reached agreement as to *where* such inspection should be inaugurated or *how* it is to be carried out.

The U.S.S.R. loudly proclaims its desire to stop nuclear testing. On our part, we do not believe the testing problem should be settled without reference to the other sides of the disarmament problem. That is why we have proposed a tentative suspension of testing for a certain period of time. During this period real progress could be made in setting up an inspection system which would enable us to go ahead with some assurance that the U.S.S.R. really means business.

For, until we have proof that the Soviet Union is serious about disarmament, we must safeguard our security by producing the best weapons we can develop. This calls for continued testing. It is only through continued testing that smaller weapons can be improved and the radioactive fallout of larger weapons reduced.

What are the chances of agreement? While the Soviet Union has given the appearance of wanting to seriously negotiate, I would not want to predict that the present discussions in New York⁴ will terminate in an agreement. I do believe that significant progress has been made. Furthermore, we must go on the assumption that what is necessary is possible, that what must be can be. The halting steps that are being taken in the United Nations today may be the first steps toward a better tomorrow.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

Even though the United Nations was created prior to the atomic age, it has contributed much to man's progress in this new and vital field.

Perhaps no speech ever made at the United Nations received the dramatic and favorable response in the hearts of men everywhere as that of President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953, when he proposed the establishment of an international atomic energy agency to help "to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

The process by which this Agency was formed was in itself a significant accomplishment in the kind of international diplomacy which has been largely fostered by the United Nations. What was remarkable was that 81 nations, in an international conference, were able to hammer out a complex agreement covering an extremely complicated and technical field and that the final document was unanimously agreed upon by all the delegations.

During the next few months the Agency, headed by Mr. Sterling Cole, a longtime and respected member of the Congress, will be planning its program for the future.

It will look into the possibility of turning atomic energy into a source of power.

It will seek to advance knowledge of the application of radiation and radioisotopes in medicine, industry, and agriculture.

It will probably undertake research on its own behalf, particularly with regard to the require-

⁴ For a statement by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Committee I of the General Assembly on Oct. 10, see BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1957, p. 667.

ments of health, safety, waste disposal, and safeguards involved in the Agency's own operations.

It will provide technical assistance to its members.

It will promote the development of nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes.

It will assist in the exchange and training of scientists and experts.

And, finally, it will set up a system of safeguards designed to insure that fissionable materials made available by the Agency are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

Here, it seems to me, is a remarkable step forward which has a significance beyond the field of atomic energy. International inspectors will have free access at all times to all places, data, and persons involved with Agency projects. For the first time in history a large number of states have declared their willingness to admit international inspectors within their boundaries in the larger interests of world peace and security.

The United States has demonstrated its devotion to the atoms-for-peace concept by substantial contributions of nuclear fuel. The President announced a year ago that the United States would make available to the IAEA 5,000 kilograms of uranium 235. Furthermore, the President stated that the United States would also match any contribution made by other nations until July of 1960.

The Specialized Agencies

The political activities of the United Nations which I have discussed with you are, of course, the most dramatic aspects of its job. But they are not the whole job by any means.

In the vanguard of man's quest for a better life are the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Their task is to help free the world from the scourges of poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance, for these are the basic causes of conflicts between nations. In attacking these world ills the specialized agencies are laying the foundation on which the United Nations, through its political activities, can build for a just and lasting peace. Admittedly political developments in the United Nations are frequently a source of discouragement. But I believe that all of us can take heart from its efforts in the social and economic fields, where real progress is being made.

To millions of people the world over, the United Nations means not the gathering of the world's statesmen for the annual General Assembly, not the Security Council, not even the charter itself. It means the team of experts from the Food and Agriculture Organization showing the people better methods of farming. It means the doctor and nurses from the World Health Organization inoculating whole villages against diseases endemic to the area. It means a group of educators from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization helping to establish a system of primary education where none existed before.

I do not suggest that this work, which cost the United Nations and the specialized agencies some \$144 million last year, will usher in a brave new world in the immediate future. But it is vital to our own welfare and the economic and political future of the world. This work is not a form of charity. It is a program of self-help, because each country receiving assistance has contributed from its own resources to the overall fund out of which these projects are financed. It is in our own national interest to do what we can to enable the have-not people of the world to help themselves to the benefits of the 20th century. And there is no doubt that this form of international cooperation is attacking effectively the sources of instability, unrest, and war.

In closing I would like to point out that we are faced with a continuing threat from the Soviet Union to dominate the world and re-create it in its own image. The men in the Kremlin have made it clear that they intend to wage the cold war with purpose and vigor to achieve their objectives. To counter the Soviet threat, to create a world of peace, requires perseverance and patience, sacrifice and understanding.

Peace with justice is the most important goal to which we can aspire. On that all of us can agree. But peace must have adequate foundations. One of these foundations is that nations must live by the principles of international law and order. Another is that they must settle their disputes by peaceful means. A third is the awareness that human beings are entitled to more than mere subsistence.

The United Nations provides the main instrument available to the world for the attainment of these essentials of peace. It may not be a per-

fect instrument, but it is the best that the wit of man has thus far been able to devise. If, to achieve its goal, the United Nations needs strengthening, then let us strengthen it. If it needs improving, then let us improve it. But let us approach our task of building a free and peaceful world with a firm faith in our ability to succeed and a firm faith in the ability of the United Nations to help us in our labor.

I would hope that, when the history of this period is written, it will be said of the United States that we worked for peace with as much devotion and courage as we worked to preserve our liberties during World War II. If we will do that, we can be sure that the forces of tyranny will dwindle and the cause of free men will prevail.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Discussions on East-West Exchanges

ANNOUNCEMENT OF FIRST MEETING

Press release 594 dated October 25

A U.S. delegation, headed by Ambassador William S. B. Lacy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for East-West Exchange, will commence discussions on October 28, 1957, with representatives of the U.S.S.R. on the subject of technical, scientific, and cultural exchanges. The Soviet delegation will be headed by Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin.

These meetings have their origin in a proposal of the U.S. Government to exchange uncensored TV and radio broadcasts of world events.¹ The Soviet Government agreed to discuss the U.S. proposal but in conjunction with the development of other exchanges and contacts between the two countries. The Department suggested meetings in October, to which suggestion the Soviets subsequently agreed. The conversations, which will cover a wide range of items identified with technical, scientific, and cultural exchange, will be carried on at Washington. The other members of the U.S. delegation will be: Frederick T. Merrill, Director, East-West Contacts Staff; Edward L.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of July 15, 1957, p. 119, and Sept. 2, 1957, p. 386.

Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs; and Malcolm Toon, Deputy Director, East-West Contacts Staff.

The composition of the Soviet delegation will be announced later.²

OPENING STATEMENTS

Press release 597 dated October 28

Ambassador Lacy:

I welcome here today the Soviet delegation, headed by Ambassador Zaroubin, to discuss with us in a series of meetings ways and means to develop and increase contacts in the technical, scientific, and cultural fields between the peoples of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Those of us assembled here are not strangers to each other in this effort. It is my hope that by sitting down together in an informal way we may be able to reach some new understanding and common approach to the problems involved in exchange—not only in exchanging scientists, technicians, entertainers, athletes, and the like—but exchange of information and ideas, which in our opinion is not only the necessary ingredient to a better understanding between all peoples but leads also to a lessening of tensions and to the development of international cooperation. Progress in the removal of barriers, currently obstructing the free flow of information and ideas, is an important objective of my Government in these talks.

At the outset I wish to restate the position of my Government made in Geneva 2 years ago almost to the day.³ At that time the Secretary of State made the following three statements:

The reductions of barriers and greater human contacts that we seek are not merely ends in themselves. They are designed to help to assure that the peace we seek is not passive, but a curative and creative force which enables men and nations better to realize those individual and national aspirations which conform to moral law.

We are naturally a friendly people, who like to know and be known. We have long wanted to learn more about the Soviet Union and its people, and we have hoped that

² On Oct. 28 Lincoln White, Chief of the News Division, told correspondents that Ambassador Zaroubin was accompanied at the meeting on that date by Andrei M. Ledovski and Boris G. Pavlov.

³ For text of statement on East-West contacts made by Secretary Dulles at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers on Oct. 31, 1955, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 775.

they would come to know us and what we say and think and do.

In the field of exchanges of information, we immediately encounter basic obstacles.

There is an all-embracing Soviet censorship of press and radio. There is systematic jamming of radio broadcasts from other countries. We hope that steps will be initiated at this conference looking to the removal of these obstacles.

Since that time 2 years ago these obstacles in the information field have not been removed in the U.S.S.R. Censorship of news dispatches still exists, and radio broadcasts of other countries are systematically jammed. It is in connection with these obstacles to free exchange of information and ideas that my Government has taken the initiative to repeat the proposal it made 2 years ago to engage in a periodic exchange of radio and TV broadcasts of commentaries on world events. In conjunction with the Soviet Government's willingness to discuss this proposal we have mutually agreed to discuss exchanges in general as well as what the Soviet Government alleges are obstacles to such contacts.

The Soviet Government, as well as our own Government, has certain entry regulations to which visitors must comply. We are aware of your belief that the U.S. is responsible for the imposition of obstacles in the effecting of exchanges of the kind we both desire. Several months ago the U.S. Congress amended the fingerprinting requirement of the Immigration and Nationality Act.⁴ Our existing laws must apply to one and all alike, and whatever legal obstacles the Soviet Government refers to as hindering contacts between us applies to everyone. I may add, parenthetically, that some 600,000 visitors to this country each year do not find our laws obstacles to their travel here.

On the other hand, we recognize that the Soviet Government, by liberalization of the ruble rate for travelers, has taken a step to facilitate tourist visits to the U.S.S.R. It is regrettable, however, that, once in the Soviet Union, the places a tourist may go are limited to specified areas. It is true also that an agreement between our countries for an exchange of official publications has been reached and the Soviet official magazine *U.S.S.R.* is currently distributed in the United States

while *Amerika* is being distributed in the Soviet Union. In all frankness, however, the arrangements for distribution have been less than satisfactory.

My Government's position regarding exchanges with the Soviet Union and, in fact, all countries is unchanged. It favors them. Where it is a question of the exchange of technical delegations, entertainment groups, and the like, you already realize that on our side it must concern private industry, individual impresarios, our private institutions and organizations. The Department of State cannot speak for them and, believe it or not, cannot induce them to do that which they do not wish to do. I cannot emphasize this point too much.

The contacts between us depend on the will of our own people. If the atmosphere is favorable and our citizens have no reason to be distrustful, they will go to great lengths to welcome any foreigner. The reputation of Americans and Russians for friendliness and hospitality is well known. To effect exchanges, then, on our side, is predicated on the attitude of our universities, our industrial leaders, and our scientific and cultural community. This attitude is sometimes affected by the feeling that the Soviet Government wishes to prevent normal contacts, preferring instead to direct them into specific channels of interest only to the Government. It is influenced also by the opinion Americans hold that there is a false picture today in the minds of the Soviet peoples concerning this country, and this is so because the majority of Russians is deprived of free access to information about the rest of the world, and particularly the United States.

As a first step, Mr. Ambassador, in the direction of a better mutual understanding of our two countries, I shall presently offer proposals which we believe will enable both our peoples to have the benefit of free discussion, criticism, and debate on the vital issues of the day.

Ambassador Zaroubin:

Translation

Gentlemen: Today we begin negotiations on the extension of contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to these negotiations. We believe that the exten-

⁴For a Department announcement and text of regulations, see *ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1957, p. 682.

sion of contacts and connections between our countries will contribute to the normalization and improvement of Soviet-American relations and the relaxation of international tension, which has always been the aim of the Soviet Government.

We hold that the extension of contacts and connections between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. both in the sphere of economy and trade, as well as in the sphere of culture, science, and technique, would allow the Soviet and American peoples to get to know each other better and help to create an atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding between our countries.

We are of the opinion that the reciprocal exchange will undoubtedly add to the improvement of business cooperation between our countries. It should be noted that something has been done in establishing contacts and connections between our countries in the past 2 years. As is known, between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. there was an exchange of agricultural delegations, specialists in housing, journalists, religious leaders, representatives of science, medicine, technique, and others. Individual American public figures, Members of Congress, representatives of the press, and a number of other people have visited the Soviet Union as tourists.

We believe that the above-mentioned visits as well as other visits of the Soviet and American representatives were undoubtedly useful for both sides. We can only regret that these contacts and connections between our countries were far from being sufficient.

Proceeding from the above, the delegation of the Soviet Union submits for the consideration of the meeting a concrete plan for cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. for 1958-59. This plan provides for an exchange of the groups of specialists in the field of industry, agriculture, health, and other fields on the basis of reciprocity.

In particular we have in view an exchange of delegations of specialists in the following industries: metallurgical, mining, automobile, chemical, radio, tool engineering, plastic, electric power, and others, as well as specialists in the construction of different industrial enterprises, planning and construction of towns, and construction of bridges.

Besides that we have in view a wide exchange of delegations of specialists in agriculture: cat-

tle-breeding, horticulture, vegetable growing, and others.

Great importance is attached in the Soviet proposals to the establishment of close connections and cooperation between Soviet and American scientists, specialists in the field of medicine among them. Such cooperation of outstanding scientists of the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. could be of invaluable use for humanity. The Soviet proposals provide for the development of most different forms of contacts and connections along with scientific exchange in other fields.

The Soviet delegation considers it useful that both sides promote exchanges of visits in 1958 of delegations of Members of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and Members of the United States Congress—an exchange that would contribute to the establishment of useful contacts between these legislative bodies and promote visits of that kind for the future.

Besides, we consider it desirable to agree upon convening in 1958-59 a joint conference of inter-parliamentary groups and convening a conference of Soviet and American representatives of organizations for the United Nations and UNESCO.

Our proposals provide for wide development of cultural connections. Particularly, we propose that an exchange of delegations of writers, composers, artists, sculptors, etc., as well as an exchange of actors, theatrical, chorus, and choreographic groups, symphony orchestras, and cooperation in the field of cinematography be carried on.

The Soviet proposals provide for establishing and developing contacts between various social organizations of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.—trade-union, women, youth, and others. Such an exchange will undoubtedly add to the improvement of Soviet-American relations.

The Soviet proposals also provide for an exchange of radio and television broadcasts on science, techniques, sports, industry, agriculture, education, and health.

We propose also that a regular exchange of radio and television programs of classic, folk, and contemporary music be organized.

We have in mind the organization of reciprocal trips of radio, television, and press representatives.

Our plan further contains a number of proposals on the exchange of delegations of university professors and teachers, as well as delegations of education workers and of students.

We propose that a wide program of sport events and sport competitions between the Soviet and American sportsmen be carried out.

The Soviet side also considers it necessary to discuss the question of an exchange of delegations of chambers of commerce and specialists in the field of trade. It would be desirable to agree upon working for the development of tourism.

We also consider it useful to carry on an exchange of exhibitions on peaceful use of atomic energy, exhibitions on pictorial and plastic arts, etc.

The Soviet side is also ready to reach agreement in principle on the establishment of direct air communications between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the basis of reciprocity.

The Soviet delegation is prepared to discuss the proposals of the American side on the question of contacts and connections between our countries.

Submitting for consideration of the American side the plan for the extension of contacts between our countries, the delegation of the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss the question of concluding a convention on cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and would like to know the opinion of the American delegation on this question.

The delegation of the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that our negotiations on the extension of contacts should promote a wider cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America in the interests of both the Soviet and the American peoples.

United States and Poland Begin Further Economic Discussions

Press release 604 dated October 30

On June 7 and August 14, 1957, the United States and Poland signed agreements providing for credits and sales to Poland of wheat, cotton, and other commodities in the amount of \$95 million at world market prices.¹ As announced

¹ BULLETIN of June 24, 1957, p. 1003, and Sept. 9, 1957, p. 444.

June 7, representatives of the Polish Government expressed an interest in purchasing additional quantities of agricultural and other commodities in the United States, and in reply the representatives of the United States said that consideration would be given to further discussions with Polish representatives at a mutually convenient date.

Officials of the Polish Embassy have recently reiterated their interest in undertaking further discussions with the United States, with a view to arranging for the possible purchase of additional commodities. U.S. Government officials have indicated their readiness to proceed at this time with further economic discussions. It is expected that the talks will include consideration of Poland's needs for further quantities of agricultural commodities in surplus supply in the United States.

The talks will begin October 31 in the Department of State. They will be conducted by representatives of the Polish Embassy in Washington with representatives of the Department of State and of other interested agencies. Tadeusz Lychowski, Economic Minister at the Polish Embassy, will be the leader of the representation from the Polish Embassy. W. T. M. Beale, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, will be in charge of U.S. representation.

Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Year

A PROCLAMATION¹

Theodore Roosevelt loved America with impassioned devotion and served her greatly in public office and as a private citizen. As President of the United States, his name is associated with epochal readjustments in the relations of government and industry, with the policy of conservation which he established, with the building of the Panama Canal, and with the peace that ended the Russo-Japanese War. His appeals to conscience sank deep into the American heart and mind and wrought enduring changes.

A man of rich gifts in many fields, at home alike in the world of books, the world of politics, and in the wild waste spaces where adventure called, he was historian and ranchman, huntsman and naturalist, Rough Rider, preacher, family man, and explorer. His contemporaries cherished him as a two-fisted fighter who loved life, loved people, feared nobody, and was as much at ease with kings as with cowboys, a wielder alike of the winged phrase and of the sledge hammer, a dangerous antagonist, and an unforgetting, unforgettable friend.


¹ No. 3208; 22 Fed. Reg. 8431.

Upon us who stand outside the circle of time in which men felt his personal spell, Theodore Roosevelt exercises a different and, perhaps, a deeper power. We see, and claim for our own, the word, the spirit, and the example that survive for us in this teacher of the principles underlying democratic institutions—this summoner to participation in the procedures of free government, adjuring us, as he entreated the men and women of his own time, to accept the responsibilities of free citizenship. He was a man on fire for his country, who kindles fires in our hearts. He was a prophet, calling upon us to fulfill our responsibilities not only for the sake of our own Nation and people but for the sake of those, throughout the world, who look to us for hope, inspiration, and leadership.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, in consonance with a request made by the Congress in its joint resolution approved by me on September 4, 1957 (Public Law 85-297), do hereby call upon the American people to observe the one hundredth anniversary of Theodore Roosevelt's birth throughout the centennial year beginning October 27, 1957, by appropriate activities and ceremonies, by the study of his life and teachings, and above all, by individual, personal rededication to those responsibilities of American citizenship which he so zestfully fulfilled.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 22d day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State.

Transfer of Property to Panama

Press release 603 dated October 30

Secretary Dulles on October 30, in the presence of Ambassador Ricardo M. Arias of Panama, signed the instrument of conveyance which transfers to Panama free of cost all the right, title, and interest held by the United States or its agencies in various lands and improvements located in and near the Canal Zone.

This ceremony marked another important milestone in U.S.-Panama relations. By this act the United States honored certain of its obligations to Panama to which it committed itself under the

terms of the treaty of 1955.¹ Public Law 85-223, enacted by the Congress and approved on August 30, 1957,² gave the Secretary of State the necessary legal authority to sign the instrument of conveyance.

Formal delivery of the instrument of conveyance is to be made by American Ambassador Julian F. Harrington to the Government of Panama in the very near future.

Views Invited on U.S.-Brazilian Tariff Negotiations

Press release 607 dated October 31

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Interdepartmental Committee for Reciprocity Information issued notice on October 31 that a public hearing will be held in December in order to obtain views and information in connection with U.S. participation in forthcoming tariff negotiations with Brazil.

Such negotiations were provided for in a waiver granted to Brazil by decision of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on November 16, 1956.³ This waiver granted Brazil permission to put into force a new customs tariff immediately following its enactment, subject to certain terms and conditions. One of these conditions was that Brazil would undertake to begin negotiations with the other Contracting Parties as soon as possible after the new tariff was enacted in order to establish a new schedule of Brazilian tariff concessions, the negotiations to be completed and the results put into effect within a period not to exceed 1 year from the date of such enactment. (This period may, however, be extended.)

Negotiations with Brazil are expected to be held in Geneva beginning in January 1958.

The new Brazilian tariff, which became effective on August 14, 1957, provides for a change

¹ For text of the Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, see BULLETIN of Feb. 7, 1955, p. 238.

² For statement by President Eisenhower on approving the bill, see *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 477.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1956, p. 893.

of nomenclature and substitutes a new schedule of ad valorem rates for the previous specific rates. Duties on many items have undergone substantial increases.

The Brazilian system of foreign exchange premiums (*agios*) has also been modified and simplified. The new rates of duty are designed in part to shift to the tariff a portion of the burden on imports represented by the former *agios*. Several of Brazil's taxes on imports, other than duties, have been consolidated.

The new tariff, together with other changes, has the effect of substantially modifying concessions granted by Brazil, including those negotiated with the United States, under the General Agreement (schedule III). The forthcoming negotiations will involve these modifications and compensatory adjustments for increases of tariff rates bound in schedule III.

Interested firms may secure additional information on the new Brazilian tariff and the new Brazilian foreign exchange system from the American Republics Division, Department of Commerce, Washington.

The Committee for Reciprocity Information is an interagency group which receives views of interested persons regarding proposed or existing trade agreements. The committee consists of a member of the U.S. Tariff Commission and representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury, and the International Cooperation Administration.

The Committee for Reciprocity Information would welcome views from interested parties with respect to the possible effects on U.S. trade of changes in Brazilian tariff legislation, including modifications in Brazil's schedule of concessions under the General Agreement (schedule III). Such views may take into account recent changes in the Brazilian foreign exchange system as they affect imports. In particular, the committee invites the submission of views with regard to any possible new concessions which the United States might request of Brazil on products not previously included in Brazil's schedule of concessions.

Hearings before the Committee for Reciprocity Information open at 10 a.m. on December 5, 1957, in the Hearing Room of the Tariff Commission Building, Washington, D.C. Applications for oral presentations of views and information, ac-

companied by written statements, should be submitted not later than 12 noon, November 25, 1957. Written statements of persons who do not desire to be heard may be submitted until 12 noon, December 16, 1957.

Further details concerning the submission of statements and applications to be heard are contained in the attached notice of the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

All communications in this matter should be addressed to: The Secretary, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C.

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING

COMMITTEE FOR RECIPROCITY INFORMATION

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING REGARDING RENEGOTIATION OF TARIFF CONCESSIONS BY BRAZIL

Submission of Information to the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

Closing date for application to be heard, November 25, 1957.

Closing date for submission of briefs by persons desiring to be heard, November 25, 1957.

Closing date for submission of briefs by persons not desiring to be heard, December 16, 1957.

Public hearings open, December 5, 1957.

Notice is hereby given by the Committee for Reciprocity Information that a public hearing will be held before the Committee in order to obtain the views of interested persons in connection with the participation by the United States and other contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in tariff negotiations with the Government of Brazil looking towards the establishment of a new schedule of Brazilian tariff concessions in the General Agreement. These negotiations are necessary by reason of the adoption in Brazil of an overall tariff revision. The new Brazilian tariff schedules and rates of duty which entered into force on August 14, 1957 have involved the withdrawal or modification of a large number of the concessions negotiated by Brazil with other contracting parties, including the United States, which are incorporated in Schedule III annexed to the General Agreement. With reference to such adoption of the new Brazilian tariff, the Decision of the Contracting Parties dated November 16, 1956 (G.A.T.T. Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Fifth Supp., p. 36) specified that as soon as possible after the enactment of the new tariff Brazil should enter into negotiations with other contracting parties in order to establish a new Schedule for Brazilian tariff concessions in the General Agreement. The Decision also contemplated that the negotiations with Brazil might result in modifications in the Schedules of

the other negotiating contracting parties with respect to their concessions initially negotiated with Brazil.

The oral and written statements responsive to this notice may deal with the effects on United States trade of changes in Brazilian tariff legislation, including modifications in Brazil's Schedule of concessions in the General Agreement, and may take into account recent changes in the Brazilian foreign exchange system as they affect imports. Views are invited particularly with regard to any possible new concessions which the United States might request of Brazil on products not previously included in Brazil's Schedule of concessions.

All applications for oral presentation of views in regard to this matter shall be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information not later than 12:00 noon, November 25, 1957. Persons who desire to be heard orally shall also submit written statements to the Committee not later than 12:00 noon, November 25, 1957. Written statements of persons who do not desire to be heard orally shall be submitted not later than 12:00 noon, December 16, 1957. Such communications shall be addressed to "Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C.". Fifteen copies of written statements, either typed, printed, or duplicated shall be submitted, of which one copy shall be sworn to.

Written statements submitted to the Committee, except information and business data proffered in confidence, shall be open to inspection by interested persons. Information and business data proffered in confidence shall be submitted on separate pages clearly marked, *For official use only of Committee for Reciprocity Information.*

Public hearings will be held before the Committee for Reciprocity Information, at which oral statements will be heard. The first hearing will be at 10:00 a. m. on December 5, 1957, in the Hearing Room in the Tariff Commission Building, 7th and E Streets, N.W., Washington 25, D.C. Witnesses who make application to be heard will be advised regarding the time and place of their individual appearances. Appearances at hearings before the Committee may be made only by or on behalf of those persons who have filed written statements and who have within the time prescribed made written application for oral presentation of views. Statements made at the public hearings shall be under oath.

All communications regarding this notice, including requests for appearance at hearings before the Committee for Reciprocity Information, should be addressed to the Secretary, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C.

Requests for information concerning commodity classifications and applicable rates of duty under the new Brazilian tariff law and also regarding the new Brazilian foreign exchange system should be addressed to the American Republics Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, United States Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D.C.

Annexed to this notice is a list of the principal commodities in Brazil's present Schedule in the General Agreement on which concessions were initially negotiated with the United States.

By direction of the Committee for Reciprocity Information this 31st day of October, 1957.

EDWARD YARDLEY,
Secretary,
Committee for Reciprocity Information

ANNEX TO NOTICE

List of Principal Commodities on Which Tariff Concessions Were Granted by Brazil to the United States Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Canned soups
Palm-beach fabrics
Fresh fruits (except citrus)
Dried fruits, not specified
Canned fruits, including jams and jelly
Canned vegetables
Oat flour
Leaf tobacco (wrapper)
Whisky
Pine resins, Burgundy pitch, colophony, and black pitch
Turpentine
Collars for shirts
Books in paper or cloth bindings
Almanacs and calendars
Paper, white, colored, or printed
Stencils for duplicating
Toilet paper
Carbon rods for electric lamps
Carbon electrodes
Magnesium or white cement
Chromite bricks for furnaces, etc.,
Whetstones, grinding wheels, etc.,
Mineral greases (cylinder stock)
Paraffin or vaseline oil
Oil for transformers
Paraffin
Earthenware for household use
Waterclosets of earthenware
Steel wool
Soldering bars and wire of iron
Safes or strong boxes of iron or steel
Furniture of iron or steel
Barbed wire
Wire of iron or steel, plain or galvanized
Staples, galvanized, for fencing
Containers of iron or steel (except tin plate) for the shipment of merchandise
Lamp black or carbon black
Scale removers for boilers
Turpentine, natural or artificial
Tanning extracts with a base of chromium salts
Soap, ordinary
Dryers or siccatives
Tetraethyl lead
Paints, ready-mixed
Accelerators, and anti-oxidants for rubber
Salicylic, sulphanilic, and sulphonic acids
Benzidine hydrochlorate
Borax
Dinitrochlorobenzene
Intermediates for the manufacture of aniline dyes
Naphthalamines and naphthols
Nitroanilines
Codliver oil
Medicinal preparations, granulated
Penicillin
Photographic and motion picture cameras
Radio and television receiving and transmitting sets
Motion picture projectors and films
Dry-cell batteries
Photographic films and plates
Electric transformers

Radio transmitting and receiving tubes
 Ocular glasses
 Electro-therapeutic equipment
 Artificial teeth
 Airplanes
 Passenger cars and trucks
 Railway passenger cars
 Bicycles and tricycles, motor driven
 Automotive chassis and spare parts
 Strops and hones for knives and razors
 Autoclaves, ovens, and pasteurizers
 Weighing machines
 Pumps, hand or machine operated
 Boilers, steam generators
 Air compressors
 Excavators, dredgers, etc.
 Manual tools
 Pneumatic and electric tools
 Forges
 Refrigerators, electric or gas
 Cranes and hoists
 Agricultural machinery and implements
 Rasps and files
 Sandpaper and emery paper
 Internal combustion engines
 Electric dynamos, generators and generating plants
 Kitchen and household appliances
 Calculating and accounting machines
 Air-conditioning equipment
 Typewriters
 Cash registers
 Printing, linotype and similar machines
 Bullgraders and other road-building equipment
 Mining and quarrying machinery
 Well-drilling apparatus
 Metal-working machinery
 Textile, shoe and other industrial machinery
 Grinding mills
 Miscellaneous power presses
 Machine saws
 Vises and lathes
 Spark plugs
 Centrifugal machinery
 Chewing gum

Pakistan Begins Repayment of Lend-Lease Silver Debt

Press release 600 dated October 29

Following is the text of remarks made at Jersey City, N.J., on October 29 by Armin H. Meyer, Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, on the occasion of the receipt from Pakistan of the first installment on Pakistan's repayment of a World War II lend-lease silver debt to the United States.

It is a privilege for me to be here today to receive on behalf of the U.S. Government the first installment of silver returned by Pakistan to the United States in accordance with the terms

of lend-lease agreements dating back to 1943. In that year the United States sent silver under the lend-lease program to a number of its World War II allies as a gesture of friendship and as a means of assisting them in carrying out their war effort. The silver being returned today was lent to the then Government of India, and it is part of the share which Pakistan, as one of the two states into which India in 1947 was divided, has undertaken to repay.

The return of this silver by Pakistan represents more than a mere shipment of treasure. It is a symbol of good faith and testimony to Pakistan's determination, as a free nation, to honor its international commitments. This undertaking is particularly significant since the commitment was made prior to the attainment of Pakistan's freedom and its assumption of sovereignty.

I am grateful for the opportunity to witness this demonstration of good faith and determination by a nation engaged in a difficult struggle for economic betterment. This occasion represents another example of the good will and mutual confidence which exist and, I am confident, will continue to exist between Pakistan and the United States.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

85th Congress, 1st Session]

The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Part 1, May 27-June 3, 1957, 1,008 pp.; part 2, June 4-7, 1957, 1,056 pp.

Policies and Operations under Public Law 480 (83d Cong.). Hearings before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on the operation and administration of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, and its relationship to foreign policy. June 11-July 19, 1957. 726 pp.

Family Farms Abroad. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Family Farms of the House Committee on Agriculture. Serial GG, July 16, 1957. 23 pp.

Import Tax on Lead and Zinc. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on S. 2376, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to impose import taxes on lead and zinc. July 22-24, 1957. 311 pp.

Safety of Life at Sea. Hearing before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. July 31, 1957. 46 pp.

Some United States Practices in International Judicial Assistance

by Paul D. McCusker

Judicial assistance is the aid rendered by the courts of one country to the courts of another country in support of judicial proceedings taking place in the country which requests the foreign court's cooperation. It is based on the conscious or subconscious realization that the territorial boundaries which limit the powers of a nation's courts should not be permitted to obstruct the administration of justice, whenever justice requires the performance of judicial acts beyond the nation's boundaries.

Experience in this field shows how universal and how human is the thirst for justice. Even countries which are unfriendly to each other for political reasons do not hesitate, except in case of actual war, to request each other's courts to further the cause of justice. Moreover, there is a considerable body of learned opinion which deems judicial assistance to be an obligation resting on customary international law, quite independent of treaty obligations.

Whether it is an obligation under international law or rests simply on considerations of comity, courts in different countries have been helping each other for a long time. This assistance takes many forms. It includes assistance in criminal cases as well as in civil and commercial cases. We are all familiar with extradition treaties which provide for apprehending and returning fugitives from penal justice.

• Mr. McCusker is an assistant chief of division in the Office of Special Consular Services. His article is based on an address made before the Embassy (Consular) Aides Organization of Washington, D. C., on October 2, 1957.

I must omit here any discussion of judicial assistance in the criminal field as well as any discussion of the complex but important question of American recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign courts. I should like, instead, to explain something of the rules which we apply when foreign countries need evidence located in the United States, frequently in the form of the testimony of witnesses, or when foreign courts wish to notify interested parties in the United States of civil or commercial proceedings taking place abroad.

Letters Rogatory

The usual form of requesting judicial aid between states is the venerable *commission rogatoire*, or what we call in English the letter rogatory. This is the document in which a court petitions its appropriate foreign counterpart to obtain and transmit the desired evidence or to serve notices on the interested parties. It is an institution which has come down to us from what we in the world of the common law call the "civil law," that is, those foreign legal systems based on a juridical approach differing from ours somewhat as the deductive philosophical method differs from the inductive.

Common-law lawyers have in the past looked upon letters rogatory, as upon some other institutions of the "civil law," as something quite alien to the common law and therefore, in some measure, suspect. In the United States it is rare to find lawyers who even know what letters rogatory are, and the Department of State writes a good many letters for the purpose of educating American lawyers in their use.

However, let me make clear at once that, although American law and practice are not thoroughly familiar with the civil-law institution of

letters rogatory, our practice in providing assistance to foreign courts is, I dare say, much more liberal than it is in many countries which have concluded treaties or enacted laws referring specifically to judicial assistance.

For example, the Department of State has no objection, subject to reciprocity requirements and the absence of any conflicting State laws, if foreign courts wish to designate foreign consular officers to take the voluntary testimony of witnesses residing in the United States, not only of foreign nationals but also of American citizens. Even though there may be no consular convention which expressly accords the right, the recognized foreign consular officer in the United States need not petition any Federal court or agency for permission to obtain evidence to be used in court proceedings in his country, provided, of course, that the evidence is voluntarily given.

Many countries, for example Switzerland, Japan, and Denmark, are understood to consider the taking of evidence by foreign consular officers, at least in the absence of a treaty, to be an unwarranted infringement of the nation's own sovereign judicial powers. Other countries, such as Bolivia, Haiti, and Yugoslavia, allow foreign consuls, either by treaty or by custom, to take voluntary testimony but only from witnesses who are nationals of the country represented by the foreign consul.

In the United States, however, a foreign consular officer may receive the testimony of any person in this country, even of an American citizen, when requested to do so by a court in his own country, but of course he cannot call the local sheriff and expect the sheriff or bailiff to bring the prospective witness to the consular office under threat of fine or imprisonment.

Advantage of Testimony Before Consular Officers

The great advantage of this system of voluntary testimony before consular officers is that it permits the consular officer to conduct the examination of the witness in accordance with the procedures of the consul's own country and, therefore, of the court which must decide the case on the basis of the testimony.

The Department of State, on the usual premise of reciprocity, also raises no objection when foreign consular officers, without coercion, serve documents issued by their courts in pending civil

cases on persons residing in the United States, whether the right to serve such documents is expressly recognized by treaty or not. The foreign consul need not apply to the Department of State or to any American court to request advance permission. Here, again, the United States manifests its liberal concept both of judicial sovereignty and of consular rights.

An unusual instance of informal American cooperation in this field is provided by a case which recently came to the Department's attention. While now independent Morocco was French Morocco, the French consul in Detroit, Mich., received a summons from a court in Casablanca. The summons, in a divorce matter, was to be served in Columbus, Ohio, on the American husband of a Moroccan woman. Not only was the French consul able to have the document delivered without having to ask anyone's permission, but he even succeeded in having a Columbus policeman take the citation to the husband.

Incidentally, I might point out that, while this Government interposes no objection to service by a foreign consular officer of a foreign court's judicial documents here, we are not so liberal in favor of our own American courts. American consular officers abroad are prohibited by our regulations from delivering civil process issued in the name of American courts to persons, even to American citizens, in foreign countries.

Now let us return to the use of letters rogatory. Letters rogatory can, of course, be used when evidence is to be given voluntarily, but, as pointed out above, this Government generally allows voluntary evidence to be taken by foreign consular officers without approaching American courts. However, if the witness whose testimony is desired by the foreign court is not a willing witness, i. e., will not give his evidence voluntarily to a consular officer, then the only method I know of for compelling him to give evidence is by the use of letters rogatory which bring into play the authority of the local courts.

The Court-to-Court System

Many countries have treaties or statutes which provide that a foreign court's written request, or letter rogatory, *must* be submitted through diplomatic channels. Other countries permit the request to be submitted either through the diplomatic channel or direct from the requesting court

to its foreign counterpart court by international mail. Obviously, the court-to-court system would work well only if there were a common language—Latin, Esperanto, or a vernacular tongue in mutual use, such as between Germany and a German-speaking canton of Switzerland. Some countries permit the letters rogatory to be presented to their courts by a local agent or attorney of the parties to the foreign action.

The practice followed by the United States Government is unique as regards letters rogatory addressed to an American court. Not only does the United States Government have no objection if the foreign court addresses its appropriate American counterpart directly; not only does the United States Government prefer that the request for assistance be presented by a private agent of one of the foreign parties, or by the diplomatic or consular representative, directly to the American court; but we do not even recognize the diplomatic channel as a method of transmittal of the foreign letter rogatory. Foreign diplomatic missions in Washington have been somewhat taken aback, I am sure, when the letters rogatory and accompanying documents they sent to the Department of State for transmission to the appropriate American court were returned to them with a polite note indicating the Department's regret that it is not in a position to handle the matter.

It must strike most of the diplomatic missions as rather strange that the American "foreign office" and "ministry of justice" decline to receive or transmit requests for assistance issued by foreign courts when their own foreign offices and ministries of justice not only transmit such requests received from abroad but, in some cases, even supervise execution thereof by the foreign courts.

The reason usually advanced by the Department of State for the apparent lack of cooperation in this matter by the executive branch is the absence of any authority in treaty or domestic law which would give the executive branch of the Federal Government the power to forward letters rogatory to the appropriate American court.

Agreement With U.S.S.R.

The United States Government has, in fact, only one bilateral agreement which refers to letters rogatory, and that agreement is with the

Soviet Union.¹ It was concluded in 1935, and the American note delivered at that time summarizes the policy of this Government. It reads, in part, as follows:

... neither the Department of State nor any other part of the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States makes a practice of acting as a channel for the transmittal of letters rogatory issuing out of courts in foreign countries and addressed to courts in the United States. In some States of the United States, laws have been enacted requiring letters rogatory to be presented to the State court by the appropriate consular officer of the country in which the testimony is to be used. As my Government is of the opinion that this practice should be generally followed with respect to both Federal and State courts, letters rogatory issuing out of a court in the Soviet Union for execution in the United States should be presented to the court to which they are addressed by the consular officer of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States within whose consular district the court in question is located.

The policy so stated in 1935 continues to be the American practice in 1957. I believe the reasons underlying the policy are two, both implicitly suggested in the American note to the Soviet Union. The first is an example of American practicality, for we look upon the use of the diplomatic courier in such cases as a mere substitute for the postman. International postal channels are usually both reliable and speedy, and it is considered somehow a waste of time and expense for the Department of State to be competing with the post office. This consideration takes no account, however, of the language problem in court-to-court correspondence.

The second basis for the Department's practice in not accepting foreign letters rogatory is reflective of the American political system. As the American note quoted above points out, some States require that foreign letters rogatory be presented to the State court by the appropriate foreign consular officer. While I have no idea how many States have now or will have such statutes, great importance, historically and traditionally, is given by the Federal Government to the rights of the several States which form our Union. Because of the strict dualistic form of our federalism, which results in a dual system of courts, the individual States are entitled to determine the manner in which the exercise of jurisdiction by the State courts is to be invoked.

¹ Exchange of notes signed at Moscow Nov. 22, 1935 (49 Stat. 3840; Executive Agreement Series 83; 167 League of Nations Treaty Series 303).

As to the practice in Federal courts, there is a Federal statute, and there has been one since 1855,² which expressly gives Federal courts the authority to take testimony on behalf of foreign courts, although nothing is mentioned therein about the manner in which the request is to be presented to the court. In fact, the civil-law term "letters rogatory" does not even appear in the statute as it now reads.³ Since this law was amended as recently as 1949, the fact that it does not provide for the use of the diplomatic channel in the transmission of letters rogatory strengthens the view that the Department of State has no authority from the Congress to act as an intermediary in obtaining evidence in the United States through the Federal courts for use abroad.

Letters Rogatory Issuing From American Courts

By way of contrast, it should be pointed out that, while the Department of State will not receive for transmission letters rogatory to be executed in the United States, the Department is pleased to observe the requirements which may be laid down by foreign countries and willingly forwards to its diplomatic missions abroad letters rogatory issuing from American courts for transmission to the respective ministries of foreign affairs. The Department also makes every effort to furnish information to American attorneys as to the specific requirements of particular foreign countries.

As mentioned above, I know of no specific restrictions imposed either by the Federal Government or by the various States on the service of documents, such as the summons and complaint, or citation, on residents of the United States by foreign diplomatic or consular officers in connection with civil cases pending in foreign courts. Strangely enough, however, what the consular officer can do without restriction, some American courts have apparently considered themselves powerless to do. Let us suppose that a court in a country where letters rogatory are the customary form of achieving justice beyond the country's borders addresses a request to an American court, rather than to its own consular officer here, to see to it that a summons is served upon a resident of the United States in order to advise him he is being sued in the foreign country and had

better take appropriate steps to defend his rights. Two court decisions would make it appear that the American court would, in many cases, decline to order its bailiff to serve the summons on the defendant in the absence of enabling legislation.⁴

Why is it that the foreign consul can do what an American court feels it cannot do?

American Doctrine of Due Process

The fundamental reason is to be found in a doctrine of American procedural law which has grown out of judicial and legislative efforts to protect absent, unsuspecting defendants in civil suits. It is a basic concept of our Constitutional guaranties of "due process" that a court has no jurisdiction, no power to act, in a case in which an interested party was not properly notified of the fact that he was being sued. This concept has been applied by statutory enactments to certain types of lawsuits, probably the majority of lawsuits, to require that a nonresident defendant must receive notice of the suit in person and that he cannot receive it in person if he is not in some way present in the area where he is to receive the notice. If he does not personally receive notice of the suit, the court has no jurisdiction to decide the case.

These principles, born out of that sense of fairness for which the American judicial system is deservedly famous, have been understood by at least two American courts to prohibit them from honoring requests issued by foreign courts to serve a summons on someone in the United States, because, say these two courts, how can a foreign court acquire jurisdiction in such a case by our serving the summons when we could not acquire jurisdiction if we were the foreign court?

Both of these American courts made a questionable assumption in deciding these cases. They assumed that the foreign courts (they happened to be Mexican courts) would not acquire jurisdiction *unless* the summons were served personally, pursuant to an order of the court. In point of fact, the jurisdiction of the Mexican courts does not depend at all on personal service of the summons on the defendants. As in many civil-law countries, the Mexican court's power to decide a

⁴ *Matter of Romero*, 56 Misc. 319; 107 N. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1907); *In re Letters Rogatory out of First Civil Court of City of Mexico*, 261 Fed. 652 (S. D. N. Y. 1919).

² Act of Mar. 2, 1855 (10 Stat. 630).

³ 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1952 ed.).

case depends on some point of contact between the defendant and Mexico, such as the place of performance of a contract, or domicile, or the place of the tort. Service of the summons was not a fact giving the Mexican court jurisdiction; it was merely the method of notifying the defendant of the pending lawsuit. But American law has so closely identified notice of the lawsuit with the power of the court to act that the American courts in these two cases felt constrained to refuse the request of the Mexican courts.

Were the same type of case to arise today, the decision might possibly be different, as the two cases to which I have referred were decided in 1907 and in 1919, respectively, during a period, that is to say, in which the United States had relatively little knowledge of foreign legal systems. Research in comparative law, considered at that time as an academic pursuit for the scholar, has become a part of the daily routine of many American lawyers and of the legal education of future American lawyers.

I trust this necessarily brief discussion of American practices in the field of international judicial assistance has sufficed to manifest the extraordinary freedom of action which the United States Government accords to foreign courts in overcoming, for the sake of justice, the boundaries of national sovereignty.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

137th Session of ILO Governing Body

The Department of State announced on October 21 (press release 586) that the U.S. delegation to the 137th session of the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization, which convened at Geneva on October 21, is as follows:

Acting U.S. Representative

Leo R. Werts, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Substitute U.S. Representative

Arnold L. Zempel, Executive Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Advisers

George C. Lodge, Director of Information, Department of Labor

Graham W. McGowan, Special Assistant to the Secretary on International Labor Matters, Department of Commerce

Otis E. Mulliken, Deputy Director, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
George Tobias, Attaché for Labor Affairs, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

Principal items on the agenda include consideration of the report of the ILO Committee on Forced Labor and a proposal for the continuation of the Committee; review of reports of several other committees, including that of the Committee on Freedom of Association; and date, place, and agenda of the 43d (1959) session of the International Labor Conference.

FAO Conference

The Department of State announced on October 28 (press release 595) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the ninth session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, which will convene at Rome on November 2:

Member

Ralph S. Roberts, Administrative Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Alternate Members

Oris V. Wells, administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, Department of Agriculture

Francis Deak, economic counselor, American Embassy, Rome

Associate Members

Robert C. Tetro, assistant administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Ralph W. Phillips, director, International Organization Affairs, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Thomas C. M. Robinson, assistant chief, Commodities Division, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Congressional Advisers

W. R. Poage, House of Representatives

Charles B. Hoeven, House of Representatives

Advisers

Andrew W. Anderson, chief, Branch of Commercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Henry Clepper, executive secretary, Society of American Foresters

Norris E. Dodd, National Farmers Union

Mrs. Ursula H. Duffus, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Stanley B. Fracker, assistant to the administrator, Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture

V. L. Harper, assistant chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

Charles E. Jackson, general manager, National Fisheries Institute

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Accession deposited: Morocco, September 25, 1957.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Enters into force December 15, 1957.

Accession deposited: Morocco, September 25, 1957.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: India, October 21, 1957.

Protocol 1 concerning application of the convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: India, October 21, 1957.

Protocol 2 concerning application of the convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: India, October 21, 1957.

Protocol 3 concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to the convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: India, October 21, 1957.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Ratification deposited: Israel, October 8, 1957.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

Accession deposited: Israel, October 8, 1957.

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.

Signatures: Indonesia, September 19, 1957; Finland, October 7, 1957.²

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 26, 1957.²

Entered into force: October 7, 1957.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

¹ Not in force.

² With a statement.

Allen B. Kline, National Farm Bureau Federation
Richard E. McArdle, chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

Walter W. Sohl, *technical secretary*, second secretary and economic officer, American Embassy, Rome

Hazel K. Stiebeling, director, Institute of Home Economics, Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture

Bert M. Tollefson, program liaison officer, Office of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture

Robert Waring, Office of International Administration, Department of State

Clayton E. Whipple, agricultural attaché, American Embassy, Rome

Administrative Officer

Edward B. Rosenthal, American Embassy, Rome

Members of the Staff

Maurine Gardner, Office of the Administrative Assistant Secretary, Department of Agriculture

Mrs. Lois Kelly, Rome

Mrs. Aleta Lister, Rome

Mrs. Norma Ritter Merli, American Embassy, Rome

Mrs. Kathleen Underwood, *documents officer*, International Educational Exchange Service, Department of State

Congressional Observers

Thomas G. Abernethy, House of Representatives

Paul C. Jones, House of Representatives

Clifford G. McIntire, House of Representatives

Staff Observer

John J. Heimburger, counsel, Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives

The Conference of the FAO, which was established in 1945, is the chief legislative and policymaking organ of the organization. Its membership is composed of 74 countries, including the United States. It meets every 2 years in regular session and may meet in special sessions, if necessary. The eighth session was held at Rome, November 4-25, 1955.

Items on the agenda include a review of the world food and agriculture situation, giving special attention to problems for establishment of national food reserves and for strengthening marketing and nutritional programs throughout the world; approval of plans for the 1960 census of agriculture; and approval of a program of work and budget to be carried on by the organization in 1958-59. Also, several important constitutional problems will be before the Conference for action, among them the reorganization and strengthening of the FAO's Council.

November 18, 1957

Signatures: France, September 27, 1957; Finland, October 7, 1957.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 26, 1957.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Signatures: Indonesia, September 19, 1957; Finland, October 7, 1957.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 26, 1957.

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Signature: France (subject to ratification), September 27, 1957.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 26, 1957.

Procès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III, and the protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.²

Signatures: Indonesia, September 19, 1957; Finland, October 7, 1957.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 26, 1957.

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Signatures: Greece, September 25, 1957; Czechoslovakia, October 10, 1957.

BILATERAL

Austria

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington October 25, 1956. Entered into force October 10, 1957. Proclaimed by the President: October 23, 1957.

Cambodia

Agreement relating to mutual mapping assistance. Signed at Phnom Penh October 17, 1957. Entered into force October 17, 1957.

¹ Partially in force, section B of the procès verbal having entered into force on October 7, 1957, as a result of the entry into force on that date of the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement.

Italy

Memorandum of understanding regarding war damage claims. Signed at Rome March 29, 1957.

Entered into force: October 22, 1957 (date of notification by each Government to the other that the formalities required by their respective laws have been complied with).

Agreement amending the agreement of December 28, 1951 (TIAS 2463), relating to investment guaranties, and providing war risk guaranties under section 413 (b) (4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 832, 847; 22 U.S.C. 1933). Effected by exchange of notes at Rome October 18, 1957. Entered into force October 18, 1957.

Luxembourg

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2014). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg October 4 and 7, 1957. Entered into force October 7, 1957.

Mexico

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721; 71 Stat. 345). Signed at Mexico City October 23, 1957. Entered into force October 23, 1957.

United Kingdom

Agreement for the establishment of oceanographic research stations in the Bahama Islands. Signed at Washington November 1, 1957. Entered into force November 1, 1957.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Joseph S. Henderson as Deputy Director, Visa Office, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effective October 28.

Frederick Irving as Director, Office of Budget, effective November 3.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 28-November 3

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Press releases issued prior to October 28 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 586 of October 21 and 594 of October 25.

No.	Date	Subject
595	10/28	Delegation to FAO Conference (rewrite).
596	10/28	Wilcox: "The United Nations: Force for a Better World."
597	10/28	U.S., U.S.S.R. statements on technical, scientific, and cultural exchanges.
†598	10/28	Protocol amending GATT becomes effective.
*599	10/28	Reassignment of Victor Purse.
600	10/29	Meyer: payment from Pakistan on silver debt.
601	10/29	Dulles: news conference.
†602	10/29	Mann: statement at 12th session of GATT.
603	10/30	Transfer to Panama of certain lands in and near Canal Zone.
604	10/30	U.S.-Polish economic talks.
*605	10/30	Cumming receives service award.
†606	10/31	U.S.-Scandinavian civil-aviation discussions.
607	10/31	Renegotiation of tariff concessions by Brazil.
608	11/1	Dulles: "Camera on Washington."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955 Basic Documents—Volume I

This publication is the first of two volumes intended to present in convenient reference form the basic published documents regarding American foreign relations for the 6-year period of 1950-1955. It may be regarded as a sequel to the volume *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, prepared by the Department and released in 1950 by the Foreign Relations Committee as Senate Document No. 123, 81st Congress, 1st Session. The usefulness of this publication indicated a need for a supplement that would bring the collection closer to currency.

In some instances the 6-year limit (1950-1955) of the compilation has been extended for the sake of continuity by reprinting a few documents that appeared in the earlier *Decade*, as well as including a few additional pre-1950 documents and some 1956 materials. Certain international agreements to which the United States is not a party have been included where the effect of such agreements on American policy formulation is obvious.

Despite its size, which reflects the growth of American responsibility in international relations, the present collection makes no pretense at being exhaustive. In many instances it has proved necessary to print summaries of developments and of individual lengthy documents or to provide nothing more than the title of a document, indicating where its text may be found. A list of the documents, fairly extensive cross-references, and an index, will facilitate use of the volume.

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